Nasso: What Cannot Be Commanded

In his Sefer HaMitzvos (positive commandment 73), Rambam writes:

We have been commanded to acknowledge the transgressions and sins that we committed before the Almighty and to articulate them when4 repenting. [The following] constitutes the confession [to be recited].… This is [implied by the Torah’s] words…,5 “They shall confess the sins that they committed.”

There is a well-known question: Why did Rambam include only the mitzvah of confession (vidui) in his enumeration of the mitzvos, but not the mitzvah of teshuvah?6

Three explanations are offered in resolution:

a) The approach of Minchas Chinuch:7

Teshuvah is not a mitzvah…. This positive commandment, [i.e., confession,] is like many of the other 613 mitzvos…. There is no mitzvah [or obligation] to [confess], nor [does one transgress if he fails] to do so. It is only that when one performs it in the prescribed manner, it is considered a mitzvah. To cite an example – divorce or claims of civil liability8 .… The laws pertaining to those mitzvos are that if the person carries out [the necessary action in the prescribed manner], he will have performed a mitzvah. Similarly, [with regard to teshuvah,] the Torah prescribes that if a person will repent, he should do so in the following manner: He should confess…. In this way, his teshuvah will be accepted.… However, he is not considered to have nullified a mitzvah if he does not repent… because [repentance] is not a mitzvah at all, just like divorce and the like [are not mitzvos that must be performed]. The Torah [merely] prescribes laws for this mitzvah [so that] if one desires that atonement [be granted for] his sins, he should repent in the manner described.

Minchas Chinuch supports this understanding based on the precise wording used by Rambam9 at the beginning of Hilchos Teshuvah, “[Regarding] all the mitzvos of the Torah…when [a person] repents for a sin, he is obligated to confess before the Almighty, blessed be He…. This confession is a positive commandment.”

Minchas Chinuch comments, “His words imply that teshuvah is not a positive commandment,10 because he did not state, ‘It is a positive commandment to repent.’ Rather, [he states that] if one resolves to [repent], it is [then] a positive commandment to verbally confess.”

b) Others maintain that even according to Rambam, there is a mitzvah and an obligation to repent.11 It is possible to say that the commandment in the Torah for the mitzvah of teshuvah is included in the verse,12 “You shall circumcise the foreskin of your hearts and stiffen your necks no longer.” This means that we are dealing with an already existing state within our hearts and must remove the foreskin of our hearts and the stiffness of our necks that already exists.13 Nevertheless, this mitzvah is not included in the enumeration of the 613 mitzvos because it is one of the general commandments encompassing the entire Torah. Such commandments are not included in the enumeration of the 613 mitzvos, as Rambam states in his Sefer HaMitzvos, general principle 4.

This is the fundamental mitzvah of teshuvah, as Rambam writes,14 “What is meant by teshuvah? That the sinner abandon his sinfulness and remove it from his thoughts, making a firm decision in his heart never to perform it again.”

As the Alter Rebbe writes in Iggeres HaTeshuvah,15

The mitzvah of teshuvah according to the Torah is merely the abandonment of sin…, i.e., to [firmly and] wholeheartedly decide in one’s heart not to repeat his foolish conduct again, [not] to rebel against G‑d’s sovereignty, and not to violate the mitzvos of the King, Heaven forbid, be they positive commandments or negative commandments.

Thus, teshuvah is nothing more than acceptance of the mitzvos – that one resolves to carry out all 613 mitzvos. If so, it is one of the general commandments because it does not have a new and specific act associated with it that is not included in fulfillment of the other mitzvos. To use Rambam’s wording,16 “[With this charge,] He did not command [us] to do anything other than what we already knew [from other commandments.]”

For this reason, Rambam only counted confession as one of the 613 mitzvos. The reason is that confession – i.e., the obligation to verbally express the resolve in one’s heart to abandon sin17 – is a specific act that is not included in the other mitzvos of the Torah.

c) Kiryas Sefer18 cites Rambam’s wording in the heading of Hilchos Teshuvah – note that these headings were also written by Rambam19 – “that a sinner repent for his sin before G‑d and confess,” and explains that “teshuvah and confession are one mitzvah.20 There can be no confession without teshuvah, since a person who confesses without resolving in his heart to repent for his sin resembles a person who immerses [in a mikveh to attain purity] while holding [the corpse of] a creeping animal.”21 (Rambam states this analogy in ch. 2 of Hilchos Teshuvah.)22 Thus, regret and repentance are the initial stages and “confession concludes the act of teshuvah.”

To explain his position: Teshuvah and confession are two essential elements of a single mitzvah. Teshuvah is the mitzvah’s component of thought, i.e., the resolve in one’s heart to abandon sin (in Rambam’s words,¹¹ “not to perform it again”), and confession is the component of speech, to quote Rambam,¹¹ “to verbally express and state the matters that he resolved in his heart.” According to this conception, the mitzvah of confession includes the obligation to repent23 because confession is meaningless without heartfelt repentance.

On this basis, we can understand the reason Rambam¹⁹ uses the analogy cited above, “One who confesses verbally without resolving in his heart to abandon [sin] is like one who immerses [in a mikveh] while holding [the corpse of] a creeping animal, in which instance the immersion will not be effective for him until he casts it away.” On the surface, it is hard to understand the necessity of citing this analogy. Rambam could have simply said that confession without abandoning sin is not effective.

However, the analogy Rambam uses explains the nature of the effect of teshuvah. There are certain side factors that can prevent an immersion from being effective, for example, an intervening substance24 separating between a portion of the person’s body and the mikveh’s waters or the fact that the prescribed time of a person’s impurity has not elapsed.25 However, these are merely side factors necessary for immersion.26 By contrast, holding a creeping animal’s corpse during immersion is the polar opposite of immersion. When a person holds an impure object, it is impossible for him to undergo immersion, which leads to a directly opposite state, his departure from impurity and achieving a state of purity. Similar concepts apply regarding one who “confesses verbally, but does not resolve in his heart to abandon [sin].” Thus, teshuvah – distancing oneself from sin – and confession are one act of purification from the impurity of sin.

According to the above, the fundamental dimension of the mitzvah is repentance – the resolve in one’s heart to abandon sin. Confession is merely a result of that resolve and the verbal expression of it. The reason why Rambam mentions only confession in Sefer HaMitzvos without referring to the obligation to repent is that when a mitzvah has two components – one pertaining to thought and the other to speech or action, the component relating to speech or action27 is counted as a mitzvah and not the component relating to thought.

Take, for example, the mitzvah of prayer. It involves two components: Divine service of the heart – as our Sages28 state, “What is service of the heart? It is prayer” – and saying the words of prayer. True, the fundamental dimension of prayer is not saying the words, but rather the thought and the intent of the heart, to the extent that “prayer without intent” – i.e., at least a general intent that one is praying to G‑d, as reflected in the charge,29 “Know before Whom you are standing,” or the like – “does not constitute prayer.”30 As explained in another source,31 Rambam’s precise wording in Hilchos Tefilah,32 “ The obligation [implied by] this mitzvah is that a person humbly entreat [G‑d] and pray every day,” indicates that the definition of the mitzvah of prayer is the expression of a specific feeling through one’s words. If the feeling of supplication is lacking, the recitation of the words of prayer is meaningless.

Nevertheless, prayer is considered a mitzvah of speech.33 Indeed, the straightforward meaning of the word “pray” is to utter words of prayer. Thus, in the enumeration of the mitzvos at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah,34 Rambam states that the mitzvah is “to pray to Him.” Similarly, at the beginning of Hilchos Tefilah, he writes, “It is a positive commandment to pray every day” because when enumerating the mitzvos, reciting the words of prayer is what is counted as a mitzvah, not the intent motivating the prayer.35

From the standpoint of nigleh, the Torah’s revealed, legal tradition, the third of the three conceptions described above appears most appropriate. There is a difficulty with the approach of Minchas Chinuch – that, according to Rambam, there is no obligation to repent – because in his heading to Hilchos Teshuvah, Rambam explicitly states that this section of laws contains, “One positive commandment – that a sinner repent for his sin before G‑d and confess.” Thus, Rambam clearly maintains that there is a commandment to repent for sin. The Alter Rebbe adopts that same position in his Iggeres HaTeshuvah,¹² stating, “According to Scriptural Law, the mitzvah36 of teshuvah is merely the abandonment of sin.” Thus – following Rambam’s approach (as indicated by his further statements in that source),37 there is a Scriptural command to repent for sin.

The second explanation given above – that teshuvah is one of the general commandments that do not involve a specific action – also seems somewhat forced because teshuvah involves not only abandoning sin, i.e., a resolution regarding one’s future conduct, but also regretting one’s past misdeeds, as Rambam writes,¹¹ “What is meant by teshuvah? That the sinner should abandon his sinfulness… and also regret [his] past [misdeeds].” This aspect, regret over one’s past is “a specific act” that “would not be known from other mitzvos.”¹³

If pressed, it could be said that regret over one’s past is an element of the acceptance of desired conduct in the future, for if one is not pained over his past misconduct and does not regret it, that is proof that his acceptance and resolve to conduct himself fittingly in the future is lacking. Thus, it could be said that regret is not a specific act since it is a necessary component of the resolve to conduct oneself fittingly in the future. However, this explanation is extremely tenuous, because in the laws of teshuvah that the Shulchan Aruch38 outlines, when explaining how a sinner can regain his status and become an acceptable witness, all that is mentioned is the resolve to conduct oneself fittingly in the future. It can be inferred from this that it is possible to make a whole-hearted resolution to carry out G‑d’s commandments in the future without feeling pain or regret over the past. This is also evident from the wording Rambam uses, “and also experience regret over [his] past,” i.e., it is not a condition and a component of abandoning sin, but rather a separate matter.39

(From a deeper perspective, it can be said that even abandoning sin, i.e., making a firm resolve within one’s heart regarding his future conduct, is also something that “is not known from other mitzvos,” because an inner resolve motivated by teshuvah is different from an ordinary resolve to accept the yoke of G‑d’s sovereignty.)

Therefore, the third conception mentioned above appears most appropriate, i.e., the reason teshuvah is not included in the enumeration of the mitzvos is because it is something experienced in the heart. Accordingly, when enumerating the mitzvos, only the dimension of speech in this mitzvah, i.e., the mitzvah of confession, is counted. However, when seen as a whole, the mitzvah includes not only confession, but also teshuvah.

Nevertheless, since all three conceptions are explanations based on the Torah’s logic, it can be said that our Sages’ maxim,40 “These and these are the words of the living G‑d,” applies to all of them. As explained many times,41 every opinion in Torah scholarship, even an opinion that is not accepted as halachah, is relevant to our Divine service. Although the actual halachah is decided according to one opinion, that is only because in actual practice it is impossible to conduct oneself according to two opposing opinions. However, with regard to the spiritual dimension of the mitzvos and our intent when observing them, there is room for all perspectives.

Similarly, the spiritual import of teshuvah includes and allows for the application of all these three approaches: a) that teshuvah is not a mitzvah, as stated by Minchas Chinuch,42 b) that it is one of the general, all-inclusive commandments, and c) that it is an individual mitzvah like all the mitzvos.43 (The reason it is not included in the enumeration of the mitzvos is because it has two components and it is the component of speech that is counted and not the component of teshuvah, which is a feeling within the heart.)

The spiritual parallels to the three conceptions mentioned can be understood by first explaining our Sages’ statement that the 248 positive commandments and the 365 negative commandments correspond to the 248 limbs of the body44 and its 365 giddim.45 As is well known, just as the body possesses 248 limbs and 365 giddim, so too, there exists “613 [corresponding] powers and sources of vitality”46 within the soul. When a person is whole, flawless in the observance of all the 613 mitzvos – which correspond to the 248 limbs and 365 giddim – then, “all the limbs of his soul are whole and perfect…. However, if he is lacking [in the observance of] one mitzvah or [if he created] a blemish [through] its [violation,] he is [considered as] lacking a limb.”47

This enables us to understand the nature of the mitzvah of teshuvah. It is “on a higher level than all the mitzvos.” Therefore, it has the power “to [heal any] blemish or compensate for [any] lack”⁴⁴ caused within the limbs and vitality of the soul. Teshuvah stemming from the depths of one’s heart touches the soul’s very essence, which is the source of the vitality of the limbs of the soul. That level is not – and cannot – be affected by the blemish of sin. To quote the Alter Rebbe,48 “even at the time of sin, it – i.e., the soul’s essence – was faithful to Him.” Therefore, from that level, new vitality is drawn down to the damaged limb of the soul, healing the blemish and the lack.49

On this basis, it is possible to explain the conception that the mitzvah of teshuvah is one of the general commandments and, therefore, is not included in the enumeration of the mitzvos. To explain: The reason the general commandments are not included in the enumeration of the mitzvos is that only the mitzvos that correspond to specific limbs of the soul are included in that enumeration. The general mitzvos that include all the mitzvos correspond to a transcendent level within the soul that defies enumeration. To refer to a similar concept: The Alter Rebbe explains50 the difference between the Torah and the mitzvos by describing the mitzvos as “limbs,” while describing the Torah – the source for all the mitzvos – with the analogy of blood, “which brings vitality to all the limbs equally in an encompassing manner.”51

Similarly, the mitzvah of teshuvah is on a higher level than all the mitzvos because its nature is that it injects new vitality into the blemished limbs of the soul. Thus, it is not enumerated among the mitzvos – which correspond to the specific limbs of the soul – but transcends them, inasmuch as it relates to the blood and the general vitality of the soul.

It can be explained that the reason why only the mitzvah of teshuvah is not enumerated as one of the mitzvos – but the mitzvah of confession is – is that the power possessed by teshuvah to heal the blemish of the limbs of the soul comes from the person’s decision and the arousal stemming from the depths of his heart, which touches his soul’s very essence, as explained before.⁴⁶ Divine service of this nature relates to the experience of teshuvah within one’s heart and not to verbal confession.52

Based on this explanation, it is also possible to offer an explanation according to an inner, mystic conception regarding the approach of Minchas Chinuch that teshuvah is not a mitzvah at all. As explained above, the potential for teshuvah to remedy a blemish and a deficiency in the limbs of the soul is because teshuvah relates to the essence of the soul, the source for the vitality of the limbs of the soul. Matters that relate to the essence of the soul are dependent solely on a person’s free choice. When a person does something because he is forced to do so, the inner dimension of his soul is not involved. His action is no more than an external deed. It follows that the lesser the external compulsion, the more of his inner self is invested in the action. Something that stems from the essence of the soul as it transcends all the soul’s powers is motivated solely by the person’s free choice, without any external influence.53

To cite a parallel concept mentioned in another source:54 A similar reason also explains the tremendous rejoicing that accompanied drawing the water for the water libation on the festival of Sukkos. The great happiness came because, “[the drawing of the water stems] from a halachah conveyed to Moshe at Sinai… that is not explicitly mentioned in the Written Law and it is merely associated with a verse by the Sages.”55 Since the rejoicing was not motivated by an explicit command, it surpassed the rejoicing associated with the festivals which is mandated by Scriptural Law.56 Following the same motif, the rejoicing associated with the hakafos of Shemini Atzeres and Simchas Torah, which are not even an obligation of Rabbinic Law, but merely an established Jewish custom, is much greater (as is the prevailing Jewish practice) even than the rejoicing that accompanied drawing the water for the water libation.

The rationale for this is explained as follows: The deeper and greater the rejoicing, the lesser the strength of the obligation. When there is an obligation incumbent upon a person, that obligation itself is like an external factor that compels him, as it were, to do what he is commanded. Therefore, as the strength of the obligation is lessened, the more inward is the source of the happiness in the heart and the deeper its roots within the soul.

Similar concepts apply regarding teshuvah. Since complete and true teshuvah comes from the very essence of the soul – for only that inner core is the source from which new vitality is drawn down to heal the blemish in the limbs of the soul – therefore, there is no commandment for this mitzvah.57 Only when a person turns to G‑d in teshuvah while motivated solely by his free choice – not even because he seeks to fulfill the commandment of the Torah – does he show that his teshuvah stems from the depths of his heart and the very essence of his soul.

On this basis, it is possible to clarify the reason why Rambam included the explanation of the fundamental principle of free choice specifically in Hilchos Teshuvah.58 Seemingly, since it is, “A great fundamental principle… the pillar of the Torah and [its] mitzv[os],”59 i.e., the pillar of the entire Torah and all its mitzvos, it would appear more appropriate to have included these explanations in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah where Rambam discusses Judaism’s fundamental principles of faith. Nevertheless, he focuses on it in Hilchos Teshuvah because free choice is intrinsically related with turning to G‑d in teshuvah, since complete teshuvah is possible only when it stems from the essence of the soul, as explained above. An indication that a person’s actions or feelings stem from the essence of his soul is when they entirely result from his free choice, without any external influence.60 By contrast, when it comes to other mitzvos, free choice is relevant only with regard to the concepts of reward and punishment,61 as explained in another source.62

Nevertheless, the conception of Rambam and the Alter Rebbe is that, according to halachah, teshuvah is a mitzvah, and moreover, an individual mitzvah, included in the enumeration of the mitzvos, i.e., as part of the mitzvah of confession, teshuvah being the component of thought of that mitzvah, and confession, the component of speech, as explained above, secs. 1 and 2.

To clarify how teshuvah can simultaneously reflect the essential will of the soul that is above association with a particular mitzvah and also be counted as a particular mitzvah: As explained in several sources,63 our Sages’64 expression, “teshuvah and good deeds,” is interpreted to mean that, through teshuvah, the actions a person carries out become “good and bright deeds,” because teshuvah introduces vitality to the observance of the Torah and its mitzvos. This is not an additional element of teshuvah. Instead, it is the ultimate purpose and goal of teshuvah – to bring a person additional vitality in his Divine service of observing the Torah and its mitzvos.

The intent is that65 the nature of teshuvah is such that it can possibly motivate a person to desire to flee from this world – a world that is “mostly, indeed, almost entirely evil,” “[one] in which the wicked prevail.”66 After a person has stumbled and become involved with the evil of the world and then realized its pettiness, when he turns to G‑d in teshuvah, he may be aroused to flee from the world, which is “death and evil” and desire to return to G‑d in the most simple sense.67 As indicated by the verse, “the spirit will return to G‑d Who endowed it,”68 he may desire death, as we see with regard to the teshuvah of Rabbi Elazar ben Durdaya,69 who “lowered his head between his knees and wept exceedingly, until his soul expired.” He felt such great regret for his evil actions that he was motivated by a desire to separate himself from the evil of this world, to the extent that his soul expired.

Therefore, with their expression, “teshuvah and good deeds,” our Sages emphasized that teshuvah must introduce light and vitality to one’s good deeds. The teshuvah of Rabbi Elazar ben Durdaya was an exception.70 Instead, the desirable form of teshuvah must not lead to a person’s soul departing the world. On the contrary, it should arouse a person to desire and seek to increase his involvement in the Torah and the performance of good deeds while living in this world.71

Even regarding the teshuvah of Rabbi Elazar ben Durdaya, there is a well-known statement of the Arizal:72

It is difficult to understand how he [merited to] enter the World to Come since he did not amass good deeds [during his lifetime…. The mitzvos that a person performs in this world serve as garments for the soul in the World to Come.] With what would [the soul of Rabbi Elazar ben Durdaya] be clothed, for a person cannot enter that realm if he does not have a garment fashioned from [his] good deeds…? However, he was a reincarnation of Yochanan the Kohen Gadol, who served in that position for 80 years and ultimately became a Sadducee….73 The garment that Yochanan the Kohen Gadol fashioned from all the good deeds that he amassed in those 80 years was taken by Rabbi Elazar.

From these statements, it is evident that the feelings of teshuvah alone are not powerful enough to enable a person to enter the World to Come, but rather good deeds are necessary.

This is the inner reason why even teshuvah in one’s heart is a specific mitzvah: This emphasizes that even though in essence the nature of teshuvah transcends all the mitzvos – and indeed, transcends the entire concept of being commanded, as explained above – nevertheless, teshuvah should not remain on a level above individual mitzvos, i.e., it should not be limited to feeling regret and a general and encompassing desire to return to G‑d. Instead, the excitement of teshuvah must motivate a person to additional vitality in the observance of individual mitzvos, and in this way, heal the blemishes in the limbs of his soul. Teshuvah thus leads to good deeds.

Adapted from sichos delivered on the 20th of Av and Shabbos Parshas Eikev, 5728 (1968)
Likkutei Sichos, Volume 38, P. 18ff.