Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 444 - The Laws [that Apply] When the Day Before Pesach Falls on Shabbos

The reason for the prohibition is that a candle is muktzeh on Shabbos, as explained in sec. 279:1.

As stated in that source, the rationale is that the search for chametz must be conducted by the light of a candle, not by daylight, and a candle shines best at night.

Generally, a blessing is not recited when searching for chametz before the night of the fourteenth, because the person “is not [searching] at the primary time that our Sages ordained [for the search]” (sec. 436:1). However, when the day before Pesach falls on Shabbos, the night of the thirteenth is “the primary time that our Sages ordained [for the search].” Hence, a blessing is recited.

See sec. 433:13 and sec. 436:1.

Pesachim 13a.

As stated in sec. 291:2: “The time for the third Shabbos meal [begins]… from six and a half [seasonal] hours [of the day] onward. If one partook of [the meal] beforehand, he did not fulfill the mitzvah of the third [Shabbos] meal.”

The literal translation of mei peiros is “the water of fruit,” i.e., fruit juice. However, the halachic meaning of the term is expanded in certain contexts and also includes any liquid that is not water or water-based, for example, eggs or melted butter, as well as the other liquids mentioned here previously.

One should not recite the blessing HaMotzi over bread kneaded with such liquids, unless he is eating enough of the bread to constitute a meal (see sec. 168:11). Nevertheless, some authorities maintain that it is not necessary to eat bread at the third Shabbos meal. Instead, these authorities rule that any foods over which the blessing Borei minei mezonos is recited are acceptable for this meal (see sec. 291:7). In fact, that section specifically mentions the question of what to do when the day before Pesach falls on Shabbos, as mentioned in the following subsection.

See sec. 462:1.

That section refers to one who eats matzah at this time with our Sages’ (Talmud Yerushalmi, Pesachim 10:1) analogy of one who is intimate with his betrothed directly before their wedding.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the Ashkenazic community of Eastern Europe. Sephardic custom, by contrast, does not prohibit eating matzah ashirah on Pesach and certainly not before Pesach. See Kaf HaChayim 462:1, 41.

As explained in that section, if dough is made with a mixture of these liquids and water, it is likely to leaven much faster than an ordinary mixture of flour and water. Out of concern that some water may have been mixed with these liquids, the Ashkenazic custom is not to partake of matzah ashirah during Pesach except in extraordinary circumstances.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to sec. 291:7. Although in that source the Alter Rebbe states that, “one should not rely on any [of these leniencies] at all unless he has no other option,” he specifically mentions the times when the day before Pesach falls on Shabbos as one of those instances when there is no other option. The Lubavitch custom is to rely on this lenient opinion and to eat fruits for the third Shabbos meal throughout the year (see HaYom Yom, 22 Adar I). See also the footnotes to sec. 291:7, which explains the practice in the Lubavitch community in detail.

See sec. 168:18 and sec. 471:8, which discuss this issue.

In that source, it is explained that the cooking process nullifies the flavor of matzah.

This custom has its source in the rulings of Maharil (cited by Magen Avraham 444:2). In particular, those who observe the custom not to eat matzah shruyah, matzah that came in contact with water, also observe the custom not to eat cooked matzah on the day before Pesach, after the fifth hour (see the Alter Rebbe’s responsa, responsum 6).

When the Alter Rebbe uses the term “hours”, he is referring to seasonal hours. For example, if the sun rises at 6 AM and sets at 6 PM, each seasonal hour is 60 minutes long. Thus, the tenth hour begins at 3 PM. If the daytime hours are longer, the length of each “hour” is adjusted.

As stated in that source, this is to ensure that one will partake of matzah with appetite.

See subsection 2 above. One must obliterate any chametz that he is not planning to use for the Shabbos meals.

Even though the fourteenth of Nissan falls on Shabbos, the Scriptural and Rabbinic obligations of that day take effect at the same time as in other years.

See sec. 434:11.

See a similar ruling in sec. 434:10.

Compare to sec. 281:3-4.

When the day before Pesach is on Shabbos, many people store away all their chametz dishes and cooking utensils before Shabbos, and use their kosher for Pesach dishes and utensils on Shabbos. These people only eat kosher for Pesach food from Friday night onward, and eat the bread used for HaMotzi away from the table where the kosher for Pesach dishes are being used.

See sec. 451:1, which speaks about the manner in which the utensils one uses for chametz during the year should be prepared to be stored away for Pesach.

All these directives apply only until the beginning of the sixth hour on the fourteenth of Nissan, which in this instance is Shabbos. From that time onward, chametz becomes forbidden and therefore, the utensils to which the chametz is attached become muktzeh. See sec. 451:3. See also sec. 446:5, which speaks of what to do with chametz discovered on Shabbos or on the sacred days of Pesach.

As explained in that source, the intent is small pieces of chametz that are attached to the sides of the utensil, whose combined volume is less than the size of an olive.See also sec. 442:30, which mentions that it is customary to obliterate even pieces of chametz that are smaller than the size of an olive. Perhaps that is the source of the advice mentioned in the main text here (Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim).

See sec. 433:25 and sec. 460:7, which state that although treading on chametz is considered an effective means of obliterating it, the chametz should be burned if possible (see also sec. 445:7). See also sec. 466:8, which mentions treading on chametz on Yom Tov. Divrei Shalom wonders why treading on these small bits of chametz is considered an effective way to obliterate them, when the substance of the chametz still remains after the chametz has been trodden upon.

Divrei Shalom resolves this difficulty by explaining that the only reason it is necessary to obliterate these small pieces of chametz is that perhaps a person will err and partake of them. However, once people have trodden on these small bits of chametz, no one will desire to partake of them.

This leniency is repeated in sec. 448:16 and sec. 466:8. The Alter Rebbe discusses a similar law in sec. 306. However, in that source the Alter Rebbe speaks about leniencies granted “for the sake of Shabbos,” while here the leniency is granted “for the sake of a mitzvah.” See Divrei Shalom to this subsection,which elaborates on the distinction between the two expressions.

See sec. 325:2, which states that food should not be given to a non-Jew on Shabbos lest he take it out of the Jew’s domain on Shabbos. The rationale is that we do not want it to appear as if the non-Jew is carrying the food to a different domain because of the Jew’s directive. There is also the issue of maris ayin, the impression that might be created, as mentioned in sec. 325:3.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), the Alter Rebbe supports his ruling in the main text, following the ruling of Magen Avraham 444:7 (in contrast to the ruling of Chok Yaakov 444:7). In that source, Magen Avraham states that it is sufficient for the Jew to give these bits of chametz to the non-Jew without any instructions, i.e., he need not explicitly tell the non-Jew not to remove the chametz from the Jew’s home.

See sec. 343:1.

Moreover, the non-Jew must have permission to eat the chametz in the Jew’s home, as stated in sec. 325:2. See sec. 440:3-4, which states that it is permissible to let a non-Jew eat his own chametz in a Jew’s home on Pesach.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to the stringency mentioned in the previous subsection.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe takes issue with Chok Yaakov 444:7. In that source, Chok Yaakov rules that our Rabbis only permitted a Jew to have a non-Jew take chametz out of his home during the sacred day(s) of Pesach, when there is a mitzvah to obliterate chametz. However, before chametz becomes forbidden, there is no mitzvah to obliterate it. Hence, Chok Yaakov rules that in the instance described here, it is forbidden to have a non-Jew take chametz from one’s home. The Alter Rebbe questions this ruling, noting that:

In sec. 446:3, Chok Yaakov follows the ruling of the other halachic authorities, who maintain that if one discovers chametz on the sacred days of Pesach, he may not tell a non-Jew to obliterate it. All he can do is cover the chametz with a utensil. This ruling seems to contradict Chok Yaakov 444:7.

b) If there is no mitzvah to have chametz removed from one’s home before it becomes forbidden, why did our Sages grant a person license to override the prohibition against giving a gift to a non-Jew?

See sec. 345, where the terms “private domain”, “public domain”, and “karmelis” are defined. In sec. 345:11 et al, the Alter Rebbe refers to the views of the Rishonim, who maintain that there is no concept of a public domain in the present era.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe illustrates this principle with the example, also cited in sec. 586:24, that it is permitted to tell a non-Jew to climb a tree in order to fetch a shofar on Rosh HaShanah.

See also sec. 446:6, which states that although the owner may not give the non-Jew the chametz as a gift, he may tell a non-Jew to throw the chametz into a latrine or a river where it will be obliterated, provided that the non-Jew does not have to take the chametz into a domain where Scriptural Law forbids carrying on Shabbos.

In this context, the term challah is referring to a portion of dough or baked good that is separated from every dough or loaf of a specific size that is baked. See Bamidbar 15:20.

The underlying principle for this leniency is that according to Scriptural Law, the mitzvah to separate challah applies only in Eretz Yisrael. The obligation to make such a separation in the Diaspora is Rabbinic in origin. Therefore, the Sages allowed leniency if a person forgot to separate challah in the Diaspora.

Beitzah 9a. See also sec. 260:5, sec. 261:2, sec. 457:9, and sec. 506:6, where this leniency is mentioned. The basis for the leniency is the principle of bereirah, retroactivity. According to this principle, even though part of the loaf was already eaten, when one separates challah after Shabbos, it is retroactively considered as if he separated challah for the entire loaf. Our Sages maintain that the principle of bereirah only applies regarding matters of Rabbinic Law, but not regarding matters of Scriptural Law. Hence, in the Diaspora, where the mitzvah of challah is of Rabbinic origin, it is possible to rely on the principle of bereirah. This concept is also mentioned in sec. 397:10.

The Jew would request that the loaf be returned to him so that he could separate challah from the remaining portion.

As explained in that source, by and large a gift given with the intent that it be returned is considered as entirely belonging to the recipient in the interval between the time it is given and the time when it is returned. However, our Sages made a distinction with regard to chametz on Pesach, and did not allow one to give chametz as a gift to a non-Jew with such a condition.

Tevel is produce from which challah was not separated, and which is forbidden to be eaten.

See also sec. 308:9, which states that when it is forbidden to partake of foods but it is permitted to benefit from them, they are not placed in the category of muktzeh.

See sec. 446:5, where this concept is restated. See also sec. 308:9.

In that source, the Alter Rebbe states:

If, however, [the person] does not need the actual substance of the forbidden object, and he is carrying it together with the permitted object only for the sake of a permitted purpose – e.g., to free the space it occupies – this is referred to as, “carrying in an abnormal manner,” which our Sages permitted.

The Alter Rebbe’s ruling here resolves an apparent contradiction between two rulings of Turei Zahav regarding the laws of muktzeh. In sec. 308:18, Turei Zahav permits pushing an article that is muktzeh with a knife, while in sec. 311:2, Turei Zahav rules that pushing an article that is muktzeh with another object is forbidden. The Alter Rebbe explains that ordinarily pushing the article that is muktzeh with another object is forbidden, but license is granted when one needs the place where the article that is muktzeh is resting.

The commentaries to the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch note that the Alter Rebbe’s ruling here contradicts his rulings in several sources in Hilchos Shabbos, e.g., sec. 259:2, sec. 308:60, and sec. 311:14. In those sources, the Alter Rebbe rules that when a person moves an object that is muktzeh with another object that he is holding in his hand, the object he is holding is considered as an extension of his hand. Hence, moving the forbidden article with it is prohibited, as explained in the Kuntreis Acharon (note 3) to sec. 259. This principle is also reflected in the Alter Rebbe’s ruling in Hilchos Lulav, sec. 651:10.

The commentaries to the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch resolve this contradiction by explaining that the Alter Rebbe composed Hilchos Shabbos after Hilchos Pesach and hence, it is his rulings in Hilchos Shabbos that should be followed (see Divrei Shalom here).

In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that once chametz is forbidden to be eaten, it is generally forbidden to touch it with one’s hand. The rationale is that we are concerned that since chametz is permitted to be eaten the entire year, the person will forget that it is prohibited and eat it. When, however, the person is involved in obliterating the chametz, he will not forget that it is forbidden.

One can also nullify his possession of his chametz before that time. After that time, however, one may not nullify his possession of his chametz (sec. 431:2).

See the Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), where the Alter Rebbe explains that it is permitted to declare one’s chametz ownerless on Shabbos, for one is doing so for the sake of a mitzvah.

Pesachim 49a.

This rule even applies on Shabbos, because the chametz can be obliterated in the manner described in subsection 9, above.

See sec. 249:6-8, which also delineates which feasts are considered feasts celebrating a mitzvah.

In the Talmudic era, the establishment of a bond between a husband and his wife was a two-stage process beginning with erusin, the consecration of a woman, at which time she becomes forbidden to all other men, followed by nisuin, marriage,after which the couple begin living together as husband and wife. At present, both stages are performed in direct sequence, one after the other.

This refers to the daughter of a kohen marrying an unlearned Levi or Israelite. If the Levi or Israelite is a Torah scholar, there is no difficulty with the match. See Nitei Gavriel (Hilchos Shidduchim U’Tna’im, p. 126, and sources cited there). See also Tzemach Tzedek, Even HaEzer, responsum 11, and the letters of the Rebbe quoted in Eternal Joy, pp. 72-75.

It should be noted that in sec. 249 the Alter Rebbe categorizes wedding feasts as feasts associated with a mitzvah, without making the distinctions made here.

The Hebrew text uses the phrase eino oleh yafeh, which we have translated as, “is not associated with a favorable mazal.” The Alter Rebbe borrowed this phrase from Pesachim 49a. Our translation is based on Rashi’s commentary there.

Based on Magen Avraham 444:9 and Chok Yaakov 444:10, the Alter Rebbe seems to be referring to the feasts that are held in the present era to celebrate a couple’s engagement, even though their consecration and marriage is held at a later date.

I.e., the beginning of the sixth hour, as stated in sec. 433:30. 443:1.

The Alter Rebbe specifies that this only applies on a weekday, because one may not obliterate chametz on Shabbos (see subsection 11 above, and subsection 19 below). Therefore, one is not required to return home should this situation occur on Shabbos. The rationale is that since the person may not obliterate the chametz, why should he return home and forgo performing the mitzvah at hand?

See sec. 431:1 and the note appended there, where this concept is explained.

The implication is that even the mitzvah to circumcise one’s son is included in this statement. This is puzzling, because a baby boy’s father violates the positive commandment to circumcise his son every moment of the eighth day that he does not circumcise the baby. Divrei Shalom resolves this difficulty byexplaining that a father only violates a positive commandment every moment he does not circumcise his son when the circumcision is postponed to a later date (see sec. 249:6). However, if the father circumcises his son on the eighth day, retroactively he is not considered to have violated the commandment to circumcise his son that day. In contrast, every moment the person does not obliterate his chametz, he violates a positive commandment, even if he destroys it later that day, for the principle of retroactivity does not apply with regards to obliterating chametz. As the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, the one exception to this general rule is the commandment to bury a meis mitzvah. Thus, every moment one leaves an unattended corpse unburied, he violates a positive commandment even if he is able to bury it later that day.

The Alter Rebbe is implying that although there is a halachic obligation to bury any corpse at the earliest possible time, if the corpse is not in a disgraceful situation and/or there are others who could bury it, the person who did not obliterate his chametz is obligated to return home to obliterate it rather than take part in the burial.

Berachos 19b. This principle is stated in several places in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch: sec. 13:4, sec. 311:2, 312:1, sec. 406:1-2, and Choshen Mishpat (Hilchos Nizkei Guf VeNefesh, subsection 16).

Berachos 20a. See also sec. 13:4, where this point is mentioned and sec. 446:5, which mentions a related issue.

See the Alter Rebbe’s Choshen Mishpat (Hilchos Nizkei Guf VeNefesh, subsection 7), which states:

When a person sees another person drowning in a sea or being attacked by thieves, and he is able to save [the other person], either through his own efforts and/or by hiring others to save him, [the person] is obligated to make such [personal] efforts and/or hire others to save him…. If he does refrain [from attempting to save the other person], he violates the prohibition: “Do not stand [idly by] while your fellow man’s blood [is at risk].”

See also sec. 329 regarding saving people from danger on Shabbos.

Pesachim 49a.

See sec. 431:2-4.

See sec. 328:2, which states:

When a person is in mortal danger…, it is a mitzvahto desecrate the Shabbosfor his sake. One who does so eagerly is praiseworthy, while one who asks [whether it is permitted to do so is considered as if he] sheds blood.

Even when there is a mere doubt that one is in mortal danger, [any activity necessary to save his life] supersedes the Shabbos[prohibitions. This is derived from] the verse, “that which a person shall perform to live through them.” What is the Torah teaching with the phrase “to live through them”? The implication is that [one should] see to it that the person should definitely live through the observance of the mitzvosand not that they should lead him to possible mortal danger.

The Hebrew text uses the expression l’davar hareshus, which we have translated as “to tend to his own affairs.” A more literal translation is, “something that is permitted,” i.e., a concern that is neither a mitzvah nor a transgression.

Simply nullifying his possession of the chametz is not sufficient, because our Sages decreed that in addition to nullifying one’s possession of chametz, he must obliterate it from his domain entirely, as stated in sec. 431:3-4.

I.e., our Sages’ command to obliterate chametz.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Pesachim 3:7.

Moed Kattan, 9b; Talmud Yerushalmi, loc. cit. See also the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah, Hilchos Talmud Torah 4:3). in that source the Alter Rebbe states:

If the mitzvah[confronting a particular individual] cannot be performed by others… one should interrupt his studies to observe the mitzvahand then return to his studies.

Needless to say, one must interrupt his studies to perform any mitzvahwhich is an obligation according to Rabbinic decree, such as prayer or the like. [He must cease studying in order to observe these mitzvos] with all their stipulations and in all their particulars, and with all the fine points required by the Sages, in a consummate manner – “for this [observance] is the entire [purpose of] man.” …

The mitzvah of obliterating one’s chametz is considered a mitzvah that cannot be fulfilled by another person, as evident from the laws mentioned in sec. 432:8.

See sec. 156:1 and the sources cited there. See also the Alter Rebbe’s Yoreh Deah (Hilchos Talmud Torah 3:5). See also Tanya, ch. 1.

Sukkah 25a, Sotah 44b.

See sec. 38:7, where the Alter Rebbe explains the rationale for this exemption: “Whenever one is involved in a task that serves the Omnipresent, the Torah does not obligate him to take the trouble to observe other mitzvos, even though that is within his capacity.”

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 246:18).

The rationale is that according to Scriptural Law, before chametz becomes forbidden, bittul is sufficient to fulfill one’s obligation to obliterate his chametz. Therefore, when one only possesses a kebei­tzah, a relatively small amount of chametz – even though were a person not to nullify his possession of his chametz, he would be liable according to Scriptural Law if he possessed an even smaller amount, an olive-sized portion – our Sages ruled leniently and did not require the person to trouble himself in order to uphold their decree. See sec. 436:7.

As stated in sec. 486:1, there is a debate among the Rabbinic authorities regarding the size of an olive-sized portion of food. Some authorities maintain that an olive-sized portion is half an egg-sized portion, while others maintain that an olive-sized portion is slightly less than a third of an egg-sized portion. The Alter Rebbe emphasizes in sec. 486:1 that when the issue at hand involves a Scriptural commandment, the more stringent approach should be taken. With regard to the prohibition against possessing chametz, the more stringent approach requires accepting the smaller measure. Since the prohibition against possessing chametz over Pesach is of Scriptural origin, that is the measure that should be followed.

I.e., the commandment to obliterate any chametz that has not been nullified. This applies on the day before Pesach. However, once the holiday commences, the person also violates the Scriptural prohibitions against having chametz seen in his domain and possessing chametz. On the day before Pesach from the sixth hour until nightfall, however, he violates only a Rabbinical prohibition (sec. 445:1).

See sec. 442:28 and the Kuntreis Acharon (note 17) to that section, where the Rabbinic commandment to obliterate less than an olive-sized portion of chametz is stated and explained.

On these days, it is forbidden to obliterate chametz. Therefore, the person should cover the chametz with a utensil, and obliterate it after Shabbos or the sacred day is over. It should be noted that outside of Eretz Yisrael, two sacred days are observed for every festival, so the person may have to wait more than one day to obliterate the chametz.

See sec. 431:2, et al.

Pesachim 7a.

According to Rabbinic Law, the person’s nullification of his possession of chametz is not sufficient and he must obliterate it. However, if the person nullifies his possession of the dough before the chametz leavens, i.e., before it actually becomes chametz, he has the potential to remove it from his domain and thus, not to be liable for possession of it when it becomes chametz afterwards. Our Sages gave a person the option of conducting himself in this manner when he is preoccupied and unable to return home to obliterate the dough.

The same laws apply throughout the Pesach holiday.

See sec. 458:1, which states that it is customary to knead the dough for matzos after midday on the day before Pesach.

See sec. 459:9.

Dough becomes chametz after sitting without being kneaded for an 18- or 24-minute interval. See sec. 459:9-11. see also sec. 467:5.

This concept is restated in 460:5. See also sec. 467:5, which states that during this time the person may also sell the dough to a non-Jew.

I.e., once the dough leavens, the owner is liable for owning chametz and for having chametz seen in his domain after nightfall, when the holiday commences, according to Scriptural Law, and even before that, according to Rabbinic Law.