Shulchan Aruch: Chapter 442 - The Laws [Applying] to the Obliteration of [Food Containing] a Mixture of Chametz Before Pesach

See the footnotes to sec. 433:12 and sec. 486:1 for a discussion of the size of this measure.

According to Jewish Law, the term “grain” refers specifically to five species: wheat, barley, rye, oats, and spelt. See sec. 453:1.

See subsection 13 below, which discusses the ruling that applies if the flavor of chametz is not discernable in the mixture. See also the Introduction to the Laws of Pesach at the beginning of this volume.

The Scriptural command to obliterate chametz includes the obligation to obliterate this type of chametz.

Pesachim 42a.

See sec. 612:4. When the Alter Rebbe uses the terms “half a loaf of bread” and “eggs”, he is referring to halachic measures cited in the Talmud and the works of the later halachic authorities. According to some authorities (Rashi), half a loaf of bread is equivalent to the size of four eggs, while according to others (Rambam), it is equivalent to three amply-sized eggs. Since the more stringent opinion should be followed with regard to matters of Scriptural Law, in this subsection the Alter Rebbe speaks of three amply-sized eggs. See also the marginal notes to the Introduction to the Laws of Pesach, where these two opinions are mentioned.

According to Shiurei Torah (3:7-8), an egg in contemporary measure is equivalent to 57 cc (2.03 fl. ounces). It must be em- phasized, however, that these measures (and also that of a kezayis, “an olive-sized measure”) are measures of volume, not measures of weight. Thus, we are speaking of the volume of an egg (or an olive). Moreover in sec. 486:2, which is based on Uktzin 2:8, the Alter Rebbe writes that these measures should be calculated without crushing the small air pockets within the food.

See subsection 9 below and the Kuntreis Acharon (notes 6 and 8) below (summarized in footnotes 33 and 56), where this matter is discussed.

K’dei achilas p’ras, “the time it takes to eat a p’ras” is a halachic measure. There are different opinions regarding the definition of this measure of time, varying from 3 to 9 minutes. (See Sefer HaMinhagim Chabad, p. 45 and notes there.) Based on Shiurei Torah (ch. 3:15), the accepted Lubavitch practice is to be stringent and consider the time it takes to eat a p’ras as 4 minutes with regard to the timeframe within which one must eat the statutory kezayis of matzah at the Seder of Pesach, but to consider the measure as 9 minutes with regard to eating on Yom Kippur. One who is permitted to eat on Yom Kippur must be careful not to eat more than a halachically prescribed amount of food within the time it takes to eat a p’ras. Thus, the stringent opinion in this instance is to consider the time it takes to eat a p’ras to be a longer amount of time.

Kerisos 12b. Although one is not liable for lashes if he eats less than an olive-sized measure of chametz within the time it takes to eat a p’ras, it is nevertheless forbidden to partake of chametz in this manner according to Scriptural Law.

See subsection 28 below, which mentions related concepts.

The Hebrew text uses the word beteilin, which we have translated as “become insignificant.” An object that is batel loses its individual identity and is subsumed in the greater whole.

See the note appended to subsection 7, which explains the apparent contradiction between the ruling in that subsection and the ruling here.

See sec. 446:1. The person is obligated to obliterate the mixture containing chametz in the middle of Pesach because it is possible that he will forget and partake of the forbidden mixture. Even though the person is not liable for lashes for partaking of the mixture containing chametz, he is prohibited from doing so by Scriptural Law. See also sec. 431:3-4.

The rationale is that were a person not obligated to obliterate a mixture containing less than an olive-sized measure of chametz, he might err and not obliterate a mixture containing a full olive-sized measure of chametz. See subsection 28, below.

That source explains the rationale for not reciting a blessing when obliterating the chametz: “There are authorities who maintain that there is no need to obliterate chametz that is less than the size of an olive if it was already nullified before Pesach, as will be explained in sec. 459[:21].”

See Avodah Zarah 49b, 74a.

See subsection 1 above.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 1), the Alter Rebbe substantiates this ruling, citing many Rabbinic authorities who rule in this matter. True. Magen Avraham 447:42 cites Bach’s ruling in Orach Chayim 447, which advocates stringency, maintaining that license is given to maintain possession of the mixture only when less than an olive-sized measure of chametz is contained in the mixture. Nevertheless, in sec. 447:45, Magen Avraham specifically rejects Bach’s ruling.

The Alter Rebbe concludes that leniency appears appropriate because the difference of opinion involves a Rabbinic prohibition and a situation – like the present – when there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis concerning a Rabbinic prohibition is considered as a situation where a doubt exists concerning a Rabbinic prohibition. Hence, we can apply the general principle that when there is a doubt concerning a Rabbinic prohibition, the lenient position may be followed (Avodah Zarah 7a). The grounds for ruling leniently in this instance are particularly strong since the vast majority of halachic authorities follow the lenient opinion.

See sec. 448:1.

The Alter Rebbe’s ruling is based on Avodah Zarah 74a. In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 2), the Alter Rebbe explains that his ruling in the main text is based on the ruling of Pri Chadash (Orach Chayim 467:10), which even permits the owner of a mixture containing chametz to sell the mixture to a non-Jew in the middle of Pesach itself. Pri Chadash explains that our Sages’ rulings regarding stam yeinam, wine belonging to a non-Jew (which is forbidden according to Rabbinic Law), is the prototype from which the laws regarding benefiting from Rabbinic prohibitions are derived.

However, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain in the main text, this rulingis not accepted with regard to selling a mixture containing chametz to a non-Jew during Pesach itself. This stringency is based on Rama (Orach Chayim 467:10), which states that whenever the actual substance of an entity forbidden by Scriptural Law is contained in a mixture, this leniency is not followed. The rationale is that in this regard, the forbidden mixture is compared to a mixture of yayin nesech (which is forbidden according to Scriptural Law) and kosher wine, and is thus governed by more severe laws than the prohibition against benefiting from stam yeinam. In our instance, the mixture contains chametz, which is forbidden according to Scriptural Law during the week of Pesach. Nevertheless, after Pesach, when the prohibition against benefiting from a mixture containing chametz that existed in a Jew’s possession during Pesach is only Rabbinic in origin (see sec. 448:1), the leniency mentioned by Pri Chadash may be followed. The rationale is that the prohibition against benefiting from such chametz is far less severe than the prohibition against benefiting from stam yeinam.

The Alter Rebbe notes that Rama (Orach Chayim 447:11) only mentions the possibility of redeeming the mixture but not the possibility of selling the mixture to a non-Jew without profiting from the chametz contained in the mixture. However, it is possible to explain that Rama omitted mention of this measure because he was searching for a solution that would allow the Jew to partake of the mixture, not merely to benefit from it.

See subsection 19, which mentions more details regarding selling a mixture containing chametz to a non-Jew after deducting the value of the chametz it contains.

An example of a dry mixture would be a loaf of matzah that was chametz that became mixed together with two loaves of matzah that were kosher for Pesach. With regard to mixtures of flour, see sec. 447:1.

According to Scriptural Law, a forbidden substance that is part of a mixture is considered batel, insignificant to the extent that it loses its own identity and is considered as an integral part of the mixture in which it is contained, when its flavor cannot be detected. In order to provide an objective measure, our Sages ruled that when a forbidden substance is mixed with 60 times its volume of permitted substances, one can be certain that its flavor will not be detectable in the mixture (Chulin 97b-98b). See also the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro, Yoreh Deah 98:1 and commentaries.

The ruling in this subsection applies when the mixture was made before Pesach. The laws pertaining to a mixture containing such a minimal amount of chametz that was made during Pesach are discussed in sec. 447:1.

There are three opinions among the halachic authorities with regard to nullifying chametz in a mixture before Pesach:

a) Raviah, Mordechai, Turei Zahav, and Chok Yaakov maintain that it is permitted to nullify chametz by including it in a mixture comprising 60 times as much permitted foods as chametz before Pesach, even if one does so with the intent of eating the mixture during Pesach. Since at the time the chametz is nullified in the mixture it is still permitted, these authorities maintain that the person is not considered as intentionally nullifying a forbidden substance. As Turei Zahav 447:5 writes, if chametz becomes mixed with permitted substances in a liquid mixture, it is permitted to add more permitted substances to the mixture until one has nullified the chametz by reaching a ratio of one part chametz to 60 parts permitted substances.

b) Maharam, Tur, Darchei Moshe, Bach, and Magen Avraham maintain that it is forbidden to nullify chametz by including it in a mixture comprising 60 times as much permitted foods as chametz before Pesach with the intent of eating the mixture during Pesach. One may, however, nullify chametz in this manner before Pesach with the intent of keeping the mixture until after Pesach. Regarding merely possessing such chametz, these authorities rely on the same reasoning as the first opinion. The Alter Rebbe rules according to this opinion. See Kuntreis Acharon (note 4, summarized in footnote 26, below).

c) RabbeinuYonah and Rashba are the most stringent, and maintain that it is forbidden to nullify chametz by including it in a mixture comprising 60 times as much permitted foods as chametz before Pesach even if the person’s intent is to keep the mixture until after Pesach. The rationale is that the person is, nevertheless, possessing a mixture that contains chametz during Pesach.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 3), the Alter Rebbe focuses on the second and third opinions, i.e., that it is forbidden to nullify chametz by including it in a mixture with permitted substances before Pesach with the intent of eating the mixture during Pesach, citing many halachic authorities who rule in this manner. The Alter Rebbe also cites numerous authorities who disagree with the ruling of Turei Zahav, that if chametz becomes mixed with permitted substances in a liquid mixture, it is permitted to add more permitted substances to the mixture until one has nullified the chametz by reaching a ratio of one part chametz to 60 parts permitted substances. Moreover, he explains, that according to this logic, it would be permitted to mix milk with 60 times its volume of water and then cook the mixture with meat. The rationale is that like chametz before Pesach, the mixture of water and milk is not forbidden. “Heaven forbid!” he comments, “May such a thing be forgotten and never be said!” The Alter Rebbe concludes by stating unequivocally that the leniency advocated by Turei Zahav should not be accepted over the opposing rulings of the many other authorities.

It must be emphasized that the difference of opinion involves an instance when it is known that chametz exists. If it is not known that chametz is present in a mixture, but there is a vague suspicion that a slight amount of chametz is present, the mixture may be cooked before Pesach to eliminate that suspicion.

See Beitzah 4b, which states: “Initially, one may not nullify the presence of a forbidden substance [by mixing it with a larger amount of permitted substances].”

The Alter Rebbe discusses this ruling in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 4), citing many Rishonim and Acharonim who support this position. The Alter Rebbe does note that Magen Avraham 447:45 states that although conceptually he agrees with this leniency, he is wary of ruling leniently because Rashba (Vol.1, responsum 485)forbids making such a mixture intending to leave it until after Pesach. However, the Alter Rebbe notes that there were halachic works that were unavailable to Magen Avraham, and therefore Magen Avraham was unaware that there were many authorities who rule leniently concerning this issue. Moreover, the Alter Rebbe concludes that one should rule leniently based on the halachic principle that concerning unresolved questions of Rabbinic Law, the more lenient opinion may be followed (Avodah Zarah 7a).

The Tzemach Tzedek (Piskei Dinim 19c-d) notes that not only is it forbidden to partake of chametz during Pesach, it is also forbidden to possess chametz during Pesach. This raises the following question – how can one keep a mixture containing chametz over Pesach? Furthermore, although the person nullified the chametz by mixing it with 60 times its volume of permitted substances, he did so intending to possess the mixture during Pesach. The Tzemach Tzedek explains that it is possible to say that since the chametz is mixed with so large an amount of permitted substances, it is as if the chametz does not exist in the person’s possession. Nonetheless, the Tzemach Tzedek concludes that he is not satisfied with that explanation.

See sec. 447:52, where a similar concept is mentioned.

In the parentheses, the Alter Rebbe uses the term shuman dagim, which literally means “the fat of fish.” Our translation is based on sec. 321:3, which explains that the term muryees refers to fish that is left to marinate in a mixture of two-thirds salt and one-third water. The salt causes the fish to exude its oils, after which the mixture is mixed with bread crumbs in order to thicken it. It is then used as a dip.

The rationale for this ruling is that since it is common to add chametz to the mixture and it is done intentionally, it cannot be said that the chametz is insignificant and that it loses its identity (see Rashba, Vol. 3, responsum 214). In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5), the Alter Rebbe explains that this responsum is the basis for Rav Yosef Caro’s rulings in Beis Yosef and in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 134:13) with regard to forbidden wine.

For this same reason, in his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 442:4), Rav Yosef Caro forbids partaking of tiriaca, a mixture containing a minimal amount of chametz and various herbs, during Pesach. The rationale for forbidding tiriaca is that although the mixture only contains a minimal amount of chametz, and contains far more than 60 times the volume of chametz in permitted substances, nevertheless the chametz is an integral part of the mixture (see subsection 22 below).

True, Rama differs with Rav Yosef Caro, stating, “there are those who differ and permit this if [the substance] was nullified before Pesach, and [the halachah] follows their ruling.” However, it could be argued that Rama is not differing with Rav Yosef Caro regarding tiriaca, but rather with regard to a matter of greater scope.

To explain: When forbidding tiriaca, Rav Yosef Caro quotes Rambam (Hilchos Chametz U’Matzah 4:12). It is possible that Rambam maintains that before Pesach, the chametz in tiriaca is batel, i.e. insignificant, in relation to the other ingredients.However, even the slightest amount of chametz is forbidden during Pesach. Therefore, it could be said that Rambam forbids partaking of tiriaca during Pesach because he maintains that the chametz it contains is chozer veneir, “reawakened,” i.e., despite having been deemed batel before Pesach, since even the slightest amount of chametz is forbidden during Pesach, the chametz “reawakens” and regains its significance during Pesach.

However, the Alter Rebbe explains that although Rav Yosef Caro quotes Rambam, his reasoning is different. Rav Yosef Caro maintains that once chametz is deemed batel before Pesach, it remains batel throughout Pesach (see sec. 447:22). Instead, Rav Yosef Caro forbids tiriaca for the reason stated above – that chametz is an integral part of the mixture. Accordingly, it could be said that Rama is not necessarily permitting tiriaca to be eaten on Pesach, but rather is objecting to Rambam’s reasoning. Hence, Rama may be emphasizing that the halachah follows the opinion that chametz during Pesach is not chozer veneir. Thus, Rama may well agree that tiriaca may not be eaten during Pesach.

The Alter Rebbe mentions that even if Rama’s intent was to differ with Rav Yosef Caro and permit eating tiriaca during Pesach, the halachah does not follow his opinion. Instead, the ruling of the many authorities who forbid partaking of tiriaca should be followed.

The Alter Rebbe explains that the logic why tiriaca is forbidden also applies with regard to kutach, a dip made with whey and chametz that was common in the Talmudic era. Since chametz is an integral part of the mixture, it is forbidden to partake of it during Pesach.

This stringency applies even though it was only prohibited to possess the chametz according to Rabbinic Law. See Kuntreis Acharon (note 9).

See subsection 3 above.

Shmos 13:7.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 6), the Alter Rebbe clarifies the contrast between the laws stated in this subsection and those stated in the preceding one, based on the ruling of Magen Avraham 451:1. Magen Avraham cites Ra’avan (Pesachim 160a), and explains that since flavor is not a visible entity, the prohibition against having chametz seen in one’s domain does not apply to it. Thus, the person is not considered to possess chametz even though the flavor of chametz would be discernible when tasting the food.

Magen Avraham maintains that this principle is evident from the fact that there is no prohibition against possessing utensils in which chametz was cooked during the entire year, over Pesach (see sec. 451:1). True, the flavor of chametz is absorbed in the sides of these utensils, and were other food to be cooked in such a utensil, it would impart the flavor of chametz to that food. Nevertheless, since the chametz is not apparent at the time of the obligation to obliterate it, one does not violate the prohibition against its possession (see sec. 447:3). Similarly, since the flavor of chametz absorbed in this food cannot be seen, there is no prohibition against possessing the food over Pesach, nor is there an obligation to obliterate it according to Scriptural Law.

The ruling here relates to a difference of opinion of greater scope that has ramifications in many areas of Torah Law. Rabbeinu Tam (see Tosafos, Chulin 98b) rules that taam k’ikar d’oraisa, “the flavor [of a substance] is considered as the substance itself according to Scriptural Law.” For this reason, Rabbeinu Tam maintains that when a food absorbs the flavor of forbidden food, the food is itself forbidden. Hence, if a bit of such food falls into another food forming a mixture, for the mixture to be permitted, it is not sufficient for the food that absorbed the flavor of forbidden food to be mixed with a permitted food comprising 60 times the amount of forbidden flavor the food absorbed. Rather, the resulting mixture must contain 60 times the volume of the food that absorbed that flavor itself.

Similarly, according to Rabbeinu Tam, if one partakes of an olive-sized portion of the food that absorbed the forbidden flavor, he is liable for lashes, just as if he had partaken of the forbidden food itself. This applies even if the portion of the food that absorbed the forbidden flavor that the person ate contained less than an olive-sized portion of the forbidden flavor bechedei achilas p’ras, i.e., within the time it takes to eat a p’ras (i.e., three egg-sized portions).

Rabbeinu Tam rules in the same manner with regard to the instance at hand, i.e., according to Rabbeinu Tam, food that absorbed the flavor of chametz is considered as chametz itself. Hence, Rabbeinu Tam maintains that one who possesses such food during Pesach is liable for possessing chametz.

In his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 208:9), Rav Yosef Caro rules against the approach of Rabbeinu Tam. In that source, Rav Yosef Caro maintains that if one eats a mixture containing a small amount of wheat flour (i.e., the mixture contains less than an olive-sized portion of flour within a mixture the size of a p’ras), and thus the mixture has the flavor of wheat, the person should recite the blessing HaMotzi before partaking of the mixture. Nevertheless, Rav Yosef Caro maintains that the person should not recite Grace after Meals after eating, even if he ate to the point of satisfaction (and thus, the obligation to recite Grace would be of Scriptural origin). This ruling is accepted by Magen Avraham 208:15 and the Alter Rebbe (see Seder Birkas HaNehenin 8:4). Furthermore, Rashi (Chulin 98b) and Rambam (Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 15:2) do not accept the principle of taam k’ikar d’oraisa.

Raavad (Issur Mashehu, ch. 2), Rashba, and Ran present a third approach to this issue, maintaining that according to Scriptural Law, it is forbidden to partake of food that absorbed the flavor of a forbidden substance. Nevertheless, these authorities maintain that if an olive-sized portion of such a food is mixed with food that is permitted to be eaten, forming a mixture the size of a p’ras, one is not liable for lashes if he partakes of an olive-sized portion of the mixture. According to these authorities, one is only liable for lashes if he eats the entire p’ras, i.e., the entire mixture. The rationale is that if a person eats the entire mixture, he will have eaten an olive-sized measure of the forbidden substance.

In light of the difference of opinion among the Rishonim concerning this issue, the Alter Rebbe concludes that in actual practice, initially, if a severe financial loss is not involved, one should act stringently and obliterate the food. If, however, a severe loss is involved, one may rely on the more lenient views that permit possessing the food.

See subsection 1, above.

Note the contrast to the following subsection, which speaks about food cooked in utensils in which chametz was cooked, and to sec. 451:1, which speaks about such utensils themselves. With regard to food that acquired the flavor of chametz, greater stringency is required, because as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, a person does not inherently refrain from partaking of this type of food. Hence, he may forget that the food is forbidden and partake of it on Pesach. See the end of the note appended to the Kuntreis Acharon (note 11) to sec. 440, which explains that this is why erecting a partition in front of such chametz is not sufficient. In contrast, erecting a partition in front of a non-Jew’s chametz is sufficient to serve as a reminder, because even when it is not Pesach, one will refrain from eating the non-Jew’s chametz since it does not belong to him.

See sec. 431:4, which mentions this concern with regard to the obligation to search for and obliterate chametz.

The owner of the food is required to obliterate it because the concern that he will forget and partake of it still applies. See subsections 13, 18, and 20, below, where the same concern applies.

As the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain in this instance, the “unfortunate event” is that the person will violate the prohibition against partaking of chametz.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 7), the Alter Rebbe cites the Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to sec. 446, where he explains that even though the Sages required that a particular act be performed, if the purpose of their enactment was merely to prevent an undesirable event from occurring, a blessing is not required before performing that act.

See Kuntreis Acharon (note 9) below, which focuses on this concept.

I.e., if the person was allowed to sell the chametz to a non-Jew, he would not receive its value and suffer a severe loss.

This opinion is explained in the Kuntreis Acharon (note 6), summarized in footnote 33.

I.e., according to the authorities who rule stringently, the person violated the commandment against possessing chametz.

The Alter Rebbe specifies that the chametz was cooked in the pot that same day, for if the chametz had been cooked in the pot some time before that day, there would be even greater reason for leniency. The rationale is that since the chametz was cooked in the pot more than 24 hours earlier, the flavor absorb- ed in the pot would be nosein taam lifgam, “adding an unpleasant taste” to the food. Therefore, such flavor does not cause a mixture to become forbidden. See the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 103:5).

That source explains that this ruling is based on the halachic principle nat bar nat diheteira (see sec. 47, footnote 222), that only the flavor of chametz is absorbed in the utensil, and thus only the flavor and not any actual substance of chametz is imparted from the utensil to the food cooked in it. Since the flavor was far removed from the food that was its source, it was weakened considerably. {See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 95:1-2) and commentaries.} When that factor is combined with the fact that the chametz was cooked before Pesach when the flavor of chametz was permitted, the non-chametz food cooked in this pot during Pesach does not become forbidden because it absorbed the flavor of the chametz that had been cooked there previously.

In sec. 447:45, the Alter Rebbe explains that there are other authorities who rule stringently and maintain that the principle of nat bar nat diheteira does not apply with regard to chametz.

Were we to rule like the more stringent views, i.e., that the flavor of chametz that the food absorbed is considered like the substance of chametz, it would be forbidden to possess the food during Pesach. Although the Alter Rebbe considers the more stringent views to be weighty enough to cause partaking of this food to be forbidden, the lenient views are also respected and, hence, the Alter Rebbe permits one to possess such chametz over Pesach.

That section explains how pots in which one cooked chametz throughout the year should be stored during Pesach.

We have translated the Hebrew term zei’ah, which literally means “sweat,” as “liquids.” The Alter Rebbe – and other halachic authorities – use this term in contrast to mashke, “beverage,” which refers to the juice produced by crushing fruits and vegetables. See sec. 320:1ff.

We have translated the Hebrew term chamutzah (which is from the same root as chametz) as “germinated.” In sec. 453:9, the Alter Rebbe rules that such grain is chametz. See sec. 453:1, 8, 9, and sec. 462:1.

Malting is the process used to produce beer and other grain-based alcoholic beverages from ancient times until the present. This process involves soaking grain kernels until they germinate, and then drying the kernels. Malting develops the enzymes required for modifying the grain’s starches into various types of sugars, which are fermentable. The malted grain is then mixed with water and left to ferment, thus producing alcoholic beverages.

After beer is made, the malted kernels of grain, referred to as “dregs,” sink to the bottom of the mixture (see sec. 319:28). These kernels have very powerful fermentation qualities, and can be used to produce other alcoholic beverages. During the malting process, the dregs absorb liquid, which also becomes alcoholic. If the dregs are strained and filtered, the resulting liquid is fit to drink. This subsection focuses on the beverages produced by straining and filtering the dregs, and the following subsection deals with beverages made by using the dregs to ferment other liquids.

It must be emphasized that the subject matter of these subsections was very relevant to the Jewish people not only because of their private holdings of beer and other alcoholic beverages, but because it was quite common for Jews to be involved in the manufacture of these beverages. Hence, questions often arose regarding these very valuable holdings. The Alter Rebbe also deals with questions of this nature in his responsa, responsa 4 and 20.

I.e., this beer is not considered as a mixture containing chametz.

As the Alter Rebbe ruled at the beginning of this subsection, the fermented malt from which beer is made is chametz.

The Hebrew text uses the term bechedei shetiyas p’ras, which we have translated as, “[the volume] of a p’ras.”In sec. 612:15, the Alter Rebbe cites two opinions regarding the size of the volume of a p’ras regarding mixtures of liquids. It appears that in this subsection, the Alter Rebbe is following the second opinion mentioned in that source and in Seder Birkas HaNehenin 8:6. According to that opinion, the intent is a volume of beer equivalent to the size of a p’ras, i.e., the volume of three kebeitzahs.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 6, summarized in footnote 33), the Alter Rebbe explains that the halachah does not follow the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam. Rabbeinu Tam maintains that taam k’ikar d’oraisa, “the flavor [of a substance] is considered as the substance itself according to Scriptural Law.” For this reason, Rabbeinu Tam maintains that when a food absorbs the flavor of a forbidden food, the entire quantity of the permitted food is considered as a forbidden entity. Hence, according to Rabbeinu Tam, if a bit of such food falls into another food forming a mixture, the entire mixture can only be permitted if the resulting mixture contains at least 60 times the volume of the food that originally absorbed the forbidden flavor. Similarly, Rabbeinu Tam maintains that if one partakes of an olive-sized portion of the food that absorbed the forbidden flavor bechedei achilas p’ras, i.e., within the time it takes to eat a p’ras, he is liable for lashes, just as if he had partaken of an olive-sized portion of the forbidden food itself.

The Alter Rebbe appended a Kuntreis Acharon (note 8) to this subsection, explaining why the ruling in this subsection – that when an olive-sized portion of a forbidden substance becomes mixed with a p’ras or less of a permitted substance, the entire permitted substance becomes forbidden – is more stringent than his ruling above. He explains that this stringency is accepted by many authorities and should be followed.

This concept is cited in the name of Rabbeinu Chayim by Tosafos (Chulin 98b) and accepted by Rabbeinu Asher and the Tur (Yoreh Deah 98). True, as mentioned in the Kuntreis Acharon (note 6), Raavad, Rashba, and others follow a more lenient view. Nevertheless, Rabbeinu Chayim’s ruling is accepted by Magen Avraham 453:4 and other later authorities.

To explain: Rabbeinu Chayim’s ruling concerns an instance where a p’ras of matzah made primarily from rice flour contains an olive-sized portion of wheat flour. Although one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of eating matzah by eating matzah made only from rice flour, Rabbeinu Chayim maintains that one who eats an olive-sized portion of this matzah fulfills his obligation because when rice interacts with wheat, it takes on the flavor of the wheat. The implication is that the entire p’ras of this matzah is considered as matzah made from wheat flour. Therefore, one need not eat the entire p’ras to fulfill his obligation to eat an olive-sized portion of matzah made from wheat flour. (This ruling is accepted by Magen Avraham and the Alter Rebbe as well, even according to the more stringent position in sec. 453:7.)

In his Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 208:9), Rav Yosef Caro also follows Rabbeinu Chayim’s position, and requires that Grace after Meals be recited after partaking of an olive-sized portion of bread that was made from an olive-size amount of wheat flour mixed together with a p’ras of rice flour or flour from other types of kitniyos. The entire p’ras of bread is considered as if it was made from wheat flour. (It should be noted that, in Seder Birkas HaNehenin 8:3, the Alter Rebbe elaborates in support of Rabbeinu Chayim’s view. However, in that source, the Alter Rebbe maintains that one should consider the position of Raavad and Rashba and eat an entire p’ras so that there is no doubt that a blessing is required.)

In the Kuntreis Acharon (note 8), the Alter Rebbe cites another instance where Rav Yosef Caro follows the opinion of Rabbeinu Chayim. In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 324:9), Rav Yosef Caro speaks about a person who makes a dough from a mixture containing mostly rice flour and some wheat flour and the dough does not contain enough wheat flour to require the person to separate challah. However, since the rice flour assumes the flavor of the wheat flour, and is thus considered batel to the wheat flour, Rav Yosef Caro rules that it is considered as if there is enough wheat flour in the dough for the person to be required to separate challah.

Similarly, in the instance in this subsection, the olive-sized portion of the barley or wheat that is chametz causes the entire p’ras of the beer to take on its flavor. Therefore, the beer is considered a forbidden substance in its entirety.

Pesachim 35a.

All authorities agree that it is forbidden to partake of a mixture containing less than an olive-sized portion of chametz per p’ras of permitted food. Furthermore, all authorities agree that such a mixture must be obliterated. Nevertheless, added stringency results from considering the entire mixture as chametz. See subsection 1 above.

See the Kuntreis Acharon (note 8, summarized in footnote 56), which mentions related concepts.

I.e., the liquid filtered from the dregs of the beer. See footnote 52.

In his Chiddushim (pp. 7d, 67d), the Tzemach Tzedek writes that Maharil told him that the Alter Rebbe related the concepts contained in this note as a directive for actual practice.

The word “it” refers to the chametz in the mixture, i.e., the fermented grain. The fermented grain is so sharp that it could not be consumed within the time it takes to partake of a p’ras, even after the grain is mixed with water.

See Pesachim 42a, 44a, with regard to kutach.

Maharil is referring to the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Orach Chayim 447:12). See also subsection 20, below.

True, as explained in subsection 6, fish-brine into which a small amount of chametz is placed to make muryees is forbidden because chametz is an essential element of that mixture. Seemingly, the same ruling should apply in the present instance, since the wheat and barley extracts are an essential ingredient in beer. Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe accepted the opinion of other, more lenient, authorities regarding alcoholic beverages, because in this instance there is a possibility of incurring a very severe financial loss, as the Maharil explains.

The term kitniyos is often translated as “legumes,” but when used regarding halachah, it refers to a far more inclusive category of foods, including several grain-like foods, such as rice, millet, and corn. See sec 453:3ff.

See sec. 453:3, which speaks of the permissibility of using foods made from this grain during Pesach.

The Alter Rebbe’s ruling in subsection 3 above does not apply here. In subsection 3, the Alter Rebbe is discussing a mixture containing a small bit of chametz, which flavors the entire mixture. In that instance, the Alter Rebbe rules that if the mixture existed in a Jew’s possession during the entire week of Pesach, the Jew may sell the mixture to a non-Jew with the exception of the value of the chametz it contains. This ruling is not relevant here because the primary value of the alcoholic beverage is the alcohol itself, which is chametz.Hence in this situation, only if a severe loss is involved, may one rely on the lenient opinion stated here and derive full benefit from the beverage after Pesach, by selling the beverage to a non-Jew.

See the following subsection.

Such beverages are chametz.

The Hebrew text uses the term he’emid, which we have translated as “ferment.” The source for this term is Avodah Zarah 35a, which speaks about using portions of an animal’s intestines to curdle milk for cheese. The term maamid, which isthe root of he’emid, is used further on in this subsection because both when curdling milk and when fermenting alcohol, the agent that brings about the change causes a fundamental alteration in the nature of the substance acted upon. The same terminology is used regarding yeast that causes dough to rise.

The Alter Rebbe is referring to an instance when the dregs of beer are used as an agent to cause a mixture of grain and water to ferment and become an alcoholic beverage. Since the grain had not been fermented before being added to the mixture, there is reason to maintain that the mixture should not be considered chametz unless there is at least an olive-sized portion of chametz in every p’ras-sized measure of the mixture (as in the instances mentioned in the previous subsection). In the present subsection, the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain that even though a far lesser proportion of chametz (i.e., beer dregs) is present in the mixture, since the beer dregs cause the entire mixture to ferment, the entire mixture is considered as chametz.

I.e., one adds beer, beer vinegar, or alcoholic beverages made from grain that was left to ferment in dregs of beer, to cheese to hasten the curdling process.

I.e., the substance that is chametz.

The term davar hamaamid refers to a substance that serves as a catalyst, i.e., it causes another entity to undergo a change that alters its nature. Examples of a davar hamaamid include rennin, which causes milk to curdle and transforms it into cheese; yeast, which causes bread dough to rise; and wine or beer dregs that initiate the process of fermentation.

This principle also applies with regard to causing milk to curdle by placing portions of an animal’s intestines in it, as stated in the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 87:11).

Avodah Zarah 35a. I.e., even if the fermenting agent is no longer visible within the mixture as a separate entity, it is halachically considered to be present in its entirety. We do not say that only the flavor of the fermenting agent – and not its substance – is present. Since the substance of the fermenting agent is considered to be present in the mixture, the entire mixture is forbidden. See 447:62, which also quotes this principle.

The Hebrew text uses the term Yam HaMelach, which literally means “the Salt Sea.” We have used “the Dead Sea,” which is the common translation of this term. This term is also an expression frequently employed by our Sages (Pesachim 27a, 28a; Avodah Zarah 13a, b, et al.) and by the halachic authorities who followed them, with regard to casting away substances from which one is forbidden to benefit.

It should be noted that when the Sages used this expression, they did not mean that the owner of the forbidden substance was prepared to literally cast the substance into the Dead Sea. Rather, their intent was that the owner of the forbidden substance was prepared to cast the value of the substance into a desolate place to which people infrequently traveled during the Talmudic era. Significantly, Rambam understands this expression as referring to “the Mediterranean Sea,” i.e., a deep sea where an article cast into it will not be retrieved (Rambam, Commentary to the Mishnah, Keilim 15:1). Similarly, in the instance in this subsection, the owner of the mead wishes to cast the value of the dregs to a place where no one will ever benefit from it.

See sec. 447:62, where the more lenient view advocated by these authorities is also mentioned.

See subsection 3, above.

See subsection 19 below, sec. 445:9, and sec. 447:1, which mention a similar concern. See, however, sec. 440:17, where the Alter Rebbe permits leniency when dealing with a non-Jew’s chametz that was entrusted to a Jew.

Cheese made by non-Jews is forbidden {Avodah Zarah 35a, the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 115:2)}.

The bracketed addition is based on the source for this lenient view, Panim Meiros, Vol. 2, responsum 75. Panim Meiros only rules leniently with regard to drinking this mead after Pesach, but not during Pesach.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 9), the Alter Rebbe cites the sources for the lenient ruling mentioned in the main text, explaining that it is based on a ruling by Panim Meiros (Vol. 2, responsum 75), which in turn is based on a ruling of Itur (Vol. 2, Hilchos Biur Chametz, p. 126b).

The Alter Rebbe cites that ruling in sec. 447:63, explaining that if after Pesach, a person took a fermented sourdough starter (i.e., a fermented mixture of flour and water) that a Jew possessed over Pesach, and used it to cause a new batch of dough to leaven, and then let that dough ferment, and used that second batch of dough as a starter to cause a third batch of dough to leaven, and then repeated the process one more time, the fourth batch of dough is even permitted to be eaten by Jews.

The Alter Rebbe, however, notes that the Itur only ruled leniently in this manner regarding chametz that was mixed in this way after Pesach. The rationale is that since after Pesach eating and benefiting from chametz possessed by a Jew during Pesach is prohibited only by Rabbinic Law (see sec. 448:1), and no Scriptural prohibition is involved, there is room for leniency. Hence, although the original mixture of fermented flour and water was chametz before Pesach, and should have been obliterated on the day before Pesach, the fourth batch of dough was leavened by a starter made from the third batch of dough. That batch is considered to have no connection with the chametz that should have been obliterated.

In contrast to this situation, the situation described in this subsection of the main text refers to mead whose fermenting agent was chametz because the mead fermented before Pesach. Accordingly, the owner was obligated to obliterate the mead before Pesach. In such an instance, one might say that since the person transgressed by not obliterating the mead before Pesach, there are no grounds for leniency and he may not benefit from the mead after Pesach. Hence, the Alter Rebbe rules that in this instance, one may only rely on this leniency when a severe financial loss is involved.

The Hebrew text uses the term lehaamido, which we have translated as, “to undergo change.” Lehaamido shares the same root as maamid, as in the phase davar hamaamid. Although we have previously translated davar hamaamid as a “fermenting agent,” in the context of this subsection the word lehaamido refers to both curdling milk and fermenting alcoholic beverages. Hence, the translation, “to undergo change.”

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See Turei Zahav (Yoreh Deah 87:13), and Sifsei Kohen (Yoreh Deah 87:36). The Alter Rebbe refers to these rulings in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 6) to sec. 445.

The Hebrew uses the term mechametz, which we havetranslated as “causes to sour,” can mean, “causes to become chametz,” in other contexts.

Orlah 2:4. The souring substance is considered like the fermenting agent mentioned in subsection 10, above.

See the more stringent opinion mentioned in subsection 10 above.

The ruling of these authorities parallels the second opinion mentioned in subsection 10, above.

See sec. 447:1, which mentions that there is also a more stringent opinion with regard to such a mixture of flour. See also sec. 453:9, which suggests baking or cooking with flour from such a mixture before Pesach because then the flour that is chametz will have been nullified.

Zevachim 79a. This is a fundamental principle germane to the laws of kashrus. See also the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 98:2).

A manuscript note appended to this subsectionstates that the chametz must also not impart sourness, i.e., any degree of leavening, to the mixture. If, however, the substance that is chametz imparts neither sourness nor flavor, the mixture is permitted to be eaten on Pesach, according to Scriptural Law. This rule applies even if there is more than an olive-sized portion of the forbidden substance in a p’ras of the mixture.

As stated in sec. 447:1, flavor is the determining factor.

See subsection 7 above.

A manuscript note appended to this subsectionstates that there are authorities who maintain that it is even forbidden to partake of such a mixture after Pesach. Note, however, the Alter Rebbe’s lenient ruling in subsection 15 below. Note also subsection 7 above, where the Alter Rebbe rules that in the instance of a severe financial loss, one may partake of foods possessed by a Jew over Pesach, if possessing those foods did not involve the violation of a Scriptural prohibition.

Different laws also apply to a mixture comprised of different types of substances, as mentioned in the next subsection.

See sec. 447:1, which explains that when the permitted and forbidden components of a dry mixture are not blended together, they remain distinct entities. It is just that, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, in the instance in this subsection, it is impossible to determine which substance is permitted and which is forbidden.

See sec. 467:1, 35. In those sources, the Alter Rebbe explains that when wheat kernels crack open due to moisture, they do not become chametz. However, they are very close to becoming chametz and will inevitably become chametz in the near future. Hence, it is forbidden to use the flour made from these wheat kernels for Pesach matzah. When the kernels dry up after cracking open, it is quite possible that it will not be obvious that they had previously cracked open.

The law in this subsection only applies when the kernels became so wet that they cracked open and then dried. If, however, kernels merely soaked in water, they are not considered close to becoming cha- metz until they actually crack open. Conversely, if the process continues and the wet kernels germinate, they will be distinct from the wheat kernels that may be ground into wheat for Pesach matzah.

The Alter Rebbe is citing the opinion of Rabbeinu Asher, Chulin, ch. 7, sec. 37, who maintains that since Scriptural Law permits partaking of the mixture, one may cook the entire mixture and partake of all of it at one time. The fact that the mixture contains substances that were originally forbidden is of no consequence. The rationale is that since the dry forbidden substances became mixed with dry permitted substances, and the permitted substances comprise the majority of the mixture, the forbidden substances are deemed permitted from the standpoint of Scriptural Law.

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch.

Rashba (Toras HaBayis HaKatzar, Bayis 4, shaar 1, p. 12b) does not accept the leniency of Rabbeinu Asher mentioned in the previous footnote and Rav Yosef Caro rules according to Rashba’s opinion in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 109:1). The Alter Rebbe mentions this opinion in the next subsection. Nevertheless, Rama (Yoreh Deah 109:2) permits the leniency stated by Rabbeinu Asher if the owner would otherwise incur a severe monetary loss.

See sec. 447:22.

Here and in later subsections, the kernels that cracked open are referred to as chametz, because – as stated above –they are close to becoming chametz.

The Alter Rebbe uses the term chozer veneir, which we have translated as, “becomes significant again”. However, chozer veneir literally means, “it reawakens again.” This term is used by the Rishonim with regard to prohibited substances that are nullified, and then become prohibited again, i.e., the substances’ prohibited quality is “reawakened”. Rav Yosef Caro uses this term in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 99:6).

See sec. 447:1 and the Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) there.

The Alter Rebbe is stressing that although it is forbidden to partake of actual chametz from the fifth hour on the day before Pesach, it is permitted to partake of this mixture at this time. However, from nightfall onward, i.e. from the onset of Pesach, the mixture is forbidden. See sec. 445:1.

See footnote 100, above. The Alter Rebbe is referring to Rashba and those who follow his understanding of the halachah.

This approach is quoted by Rav Yosef Caro in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 109:1).

See sec. 453:12, where this stringency is repeated.

See subsection 14. That subsection states that the license to maintain possession of the kernels applies “according to the authorities who maintain that whenever a [dry] forbidden [substance] becomes mixed with a majority of [a dry] permitted [substance, forming] a dry mixture, it is permitted to cook the entire mixture in one pot and eat [all the components] together at the same time.” Thus, according to the more stringent view, it is not permitted to maintain possession of the mixture of kernels.

See Kuntreis Acharon (note 9), explained in footnote 83 above.

See also sec. 447:1, where the Alter Rebbe writes that the money the owner receives from the non-Jew in payment for the kernels that are kosher for Pesach is permitted: “Since he does not receive money for the forbidden [substances], it is as if he separated [them] from the permitted substances.”

As mentioned in footnote 100, the cited source is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 109:1-2) and the gloss of Rama there.

I.e., the flour made from the kernels that are close to becoming chametz.

See sec. 447:22, where the Alter Rebbe rules that if the chametz in the mixture remains distinct from the non-chametz part of the mixture, and does not undergo a change from its original state, the chametz becomes halachically significant again during Pesach. As in this subsection, in that source, the Alter Rebbe rules that if, however, the chametz is mixed with a substance that is kosher for Pesach, and is no longer a distinct entity within the mixture, the chametz does not regain its halachic significance during Pesach. However, in sec. 447:22, the Alter Rebbe also cites authorities who rule more stringently.

As will be explained in that source and in sec. 447:1, there is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis as to whether the flour made from the wheat kernels that became chametz and was mixed with flour made from wheat kernels that were kosher for Pesach could become significant again during Pesach, as is the law regarding the kernels of grain mentioned in subsection 14, above. Although the prevailing ruling is that the flour made from wheat kernels that became chametz does not become significant again during Pesach, weight is given to the stringent opinion. If, however, matzah is made from the mixture of the two batches of flour before Pesach, all authorities accept the lenient position.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 10), the Alter Rebbe supports his ruling in the main text that before Pesach it is permitted to add kernels of wheat that are kosher for Pesach to a mixture containing some kernels that are kosher for Pesach and some that are not kosher for Pesach so that the amount of kosher kernerls will be 60 times the amount of the forbidden kernels, and grind the entire mixture into one batch of flour. As support, he cites the rulings of Magen Avraham 447:11. In that source, Magen Avraham rules that when chametz became mixed with food that is kosher for Pesach, before Pesach, it is permitted to cook the mixture so that the food that is chametz dissolves and is no longer a distinct entity.

On the basis of that ruling, Magen Avraham 467:4 rules that before Pesach it is permitted to grind together a mixture comprised of wheat kernels that became chametz and wheat kernels that are kosher for Pesach. This ruling follows the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 109:2) and commentaries there, where Rav Yosef Caro rules that one may add permitted substances to a mixture of two dry substances so that the forbidden substance will be nullified in 60 times the amount of permitted substances. The Alter Rebbe cites other rulings of Magen Avraham that reflect this principle.

However, the Alter Rebbe notes that Rashba (Vol. 1, responsum 485) rules stringently {and the Alter Rebbe gives weight to this opinion in the Kuntreis Acharon (note 4) summarized in footnote 26 above, and in sec. 453:10}, and forbids adding wheat kernels that are kosher for Pesach to a mixture comprised of a ratio of less than 60 times such wheat kernels to chametz kernels when it is possible to detect which kernels have become chametz and which have not. The Alter Rebbe explains that Rashba’s ruling does not represent a contradiction to the ruling here, because here, the kernels that have become chametz cannot be detected.

Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe notes that it appears that Rashba himself is more stringent and would also forbid adding permitted substances to dry mixtures containing a ratio of less than 60 times permitted substances to forbidden substances, as is permitted by Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah, loc. cit.).In this regard, however, Rav Yosef Caro’s opinion is accepted as halachah.

All the above follows the perspective of Magen Avraham, who maintains that during Pesach, it is permitted to maintain possession of a mixture of kernels that are kosher for Pesach and kernels that are not kosher for Pesach, provided that the mixture contains a majority of kosher kernels. Nevertheless, as will be explained in subsection 18, there is another perspective, that of Turei Zahav, who rules stringently regarding such mixtures of kernels (see Turei Zahav 447:18), and primacy is given to Turei Zahav’s perspective.

Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe explains that his lenient ruling is allowed to stand because in an earlier ruling, Turei Zahav maintains that before Pesach, it is permitted to add flour that is kosher for Pesach to a mixture comprised of a ratio of less than 60 times such flour to flour made from wheat kernels that cracked, in order to nullify the presence of chametz flour (see Turei Zahav 447:5). Since a Scriptural prohibition is not involved, leniency may be granted, for – albeit for different reasons – both Magen Avraham and Turei Zahav would allow kosher-for-Pesach flour to be added to the mixture to nullify the flour made from the cracked-open kernels of wheat.

Thus, grinding the kernels that may have become chametz before Pesach results in a leniency even according to the authorities who permit maintaining possession of the mixture during Pesach, for in this way, it becomes permitted to partake of the flour on Pesach.

See subsection 5, where the Alter Rebbe rules that as an initial preference, it is forbidden to nullify a substance that is Scripturally forbidden.

See subsection 15, above. A manuscript note appended to the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch refers to the concepts mentioned in the Kuntreis Acharon (note 10), and states:

[The person] is only adding to [the mixture] so that [the forbidden substance] will not become significant again during Pesach. Were a similar situation to occur with regard to the prohibition against partaking of [a mixture of] other forbidden [substances], it would be permitted to add to a dry mixture that contained a majority [of permitted substances – in which instance, the forbidden substance would be] batel[according to Scriptural Law] – so that [the mixture] would contain 60 times [the volume of the forbidden substance, enabling it] to be cooked in one pot and to be eaten in its entirety by one person at one time. This applies even according to the approach of Rashbamentioned above. In this instance, there is no difficulty in that one is intentionally nullifying the presence of forbidden [substances], as mentioned in [the Shulchan Aruchof Rav Yosef Caro] (Yoreh Deah109[:2]). Consult that source.

After the above has been done, even the authorities who rule stringently in subsection 18 below would allow one to partake of matzah made from such flour, even when a severe financial loss is not involved. See also sec. 453:11, where these concepts are restated.

Thus, the owner does not have the option of grinding additional kosher-for-Pesach kernels into flour and adding to the mixture until it contains a ratio of 60 times as much kosher-for-Pesach kernels as kernels that are deemed chametz.

As the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, if another Jew is in- volved, the situation represents an instance where there is a doubtful situation and two Jews are involv- ed, where leniency is granted.

The owner may not, however, grind these kernels of wheat into flour and use that flour during Pesach.

The second Jew is also forbidden to make flour from those kernels for use during Pesach.

See the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yosef Caro (Yoreh Deah 109:2) and the gloss of Rama there.

I.e., these authorities do not accept the leniency stated in subsection 17 (and similarly, the leniency stated in subsection 14). As the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, the rationale for this stringency is that even the slightest amount of chametz is forbidden to be eaten during Pesach. Hence, as a safeguard against partaking of the wheat kernels that are chametz, these authorities maintain that it is also forbidden to maintain possession of them.

I.e., according to this view, even if the owner sold the majority of the mixture to a non-Jew, it is not assumed that all of the chametz kernels were in the portion sold to the non-Jew.

Based on sec. 447:16, it would appear that the intent here is that although the person must remove the mixture entirely from his possession, he is, however, permitted to benefit from the kosher flour in the mixture during Pesach. Thus, rather than destroy it, he could sell the mixture to a non-Jew except for the value of the chametz mixed into it.

Thus, it is forbidden to maintain possession of such a mixture during Pesach unless a severe financial loss is involved. See sec. 447:22, which renders a similar ruling.

However in sec. 453:11, it is apparent that this stringency applies only when the kernels are intact. If the mixture of kernels was already ground into flour, it is permitted to maintain possession of the flour during Pesach.

That source, however, mentions an additional stipulation. When one is permitted to maintain possession of the kernels during Pesach because otherwise he would incur a severe financial loss, he is required to remove some of the kernels from the mixture before Pesach.

I.e., all the leniencies mention- ed in the preceding subsections.

See subsection 3, above. See also sec. 447:61, where this law is restated.

See subsection 5, above. As explained there, since the chametz is not forbidden before Pesach, there is no prohibition against nullifying its presence before Pesach for the sake of eating it after Pesach.

Avodah Zarah 35b mentions a Rabbinic prohibition against partaking of bread baked by a non-Jew. Rav Yosef Caro states this prohibition in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 112:1).

In his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 112:2), Rav Yosef Caro writes that because of the difficulty in obtaining bread baked by Jews, eating kosher bread baked by a non-Jewish baker was permitted in many places because of the pressing nature of the situation. (The Alter Rebbe mentions this leniency in sec. 242:13, sec. 325:6, and sec. 603:1.)

This section is not extant in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch. See Rama (Yoreh Deah 112:11), who states that it has become customary not to buy pieces of bread from a non-Jew, lest it be non-kosher bread that a Jew sold to him.

In that section, the Alter Rebbe explains that when a Jew owns kernels of grain that absorbed water, he is forbidden to maintain ownership of them during Pesach, but he is permitted to benefit from them. Hence, he should sell them to a non-Jew. When doing so, he should be careful to sell only a small amount of kernels to a non-Jew at one time, so that the non-Jew will not sell them to another Jew.

Pesachim 43a.

As stated in that source, the dough began to change its appearance, but did not finish rising.

Rabbeinu Gershom (Menachos 54a) defines the term nukshah as meaning “firm,” i.e., the dough is firm; it is not chametz in a complete sense, nor is it matzah. Rashi (Menachos, op. cit.) interprets nukshah as meaning “impaired,” i.e., it is inferior chametz.

Pesachim 43a, 48b.

See subsection 7.

In this respect, the laws that apply to chametz nukshah are even more severe than those applying to a mixture of flour that is comprised of chametz and kosher-for-Pesach flour that existed in a Jew’s possession during Pesach. See subsection 13, above.

Pesachim 45b.

Ibid. 39b. The Alter Rebbe is quoting Rambam’s definition of a milugma (see Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, Sheviis 8:1). Rambam explains that this type of poultice reduces the swelling of a wound.

Pesachim 45b. The Alter Rebbe also mentioned this concept in sec. 433:25.

One is permitted to benefit from chametz that has rotted to this extent during Pesach (see sec. 445:11). Nevertheless, it is forbidden to partake of this chametz, as stated in subsection 32 below.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Pesachim 2:6. Similarly, it is forbidden to benefit from such substances during Pesach. See subsection 34 below.

I.e., until they are obliterated entirely.

I.e., the laws mentioned in subsections 20-21.

The chametz mentioned in this subsection is totally nullified by being mixed with the distasteful substance. Thus, it is as if the chametz was already obliterated. In contrast, subsection 21 describes a situation where chametz is not mixed with anything else. Therefore, it cannot be said that its presence was nullified.

Among the practical ramifications of the law in this subsection is that during Pesach, it is permitted to own medications that contain chametz, since medications are unfit for ordinary human consumption. Moreover, one may benefit from such chametz during Pesach by selling such medications to non-Jews. See subsection 24, below.

See the footnotes to sec. 433:12 and sec. 486:1 for a discussion of the size of an olive-sized portion. See footnote 6 above for the definition of a p’ras.

The ruling in this subsection seems to contradict the ruling in subsection 9, where the Alter Rebbe states that whenever an olive-sized measure of chametz becomes mixed with a p’ras of other foods, the entire mixture is considered as chametz. However, that ruling does not apply to the instance in this subsection, because in this subsection, the substances with which the chametz is mixed are not fit for human consumption.

This prohibition even applies to a person who is ill, unless doctors determine that the failure to partake of such a mixture will pose a threat to the person’s life.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 11), the Alter Rebbe calls attention to his earlier statements in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 5). In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains the prohibition against partaking of tiriaca at length, highlighting the fact that the reason tiriaca is forbidden is that chametz is an integral part of its makeup. The Alter Rebbe also cites Rashba (Vol. 3, responsum 214), where Rashba protests against the use of remedies that contain chametz during Pesach, even though the remedies are not fit for ordinary human consumption.

See subsection 6, which explains that chametz which is an integral part of a mixture is nevernullified within the mixture. Subsection 6, however, refers to a mixture made up of chametz and foods that are fit for human consumption. Therefore, it is forbidden to possess the mixture during Pesach. The present subsection, by contrast, speaks about a mixture made up of chametz and substances that are not fit for human consumption. Hence, in this instance, it is permitted to maintain possession of such a mixture during Pesach.

Flour was – and still is – one of the substances used when tanning hides and transforming them into leather.

Pesachim 45b.

With this sentence, the Alter Rebbe explains the difference between this ruling and the strin- gent ruling in subsection 21 above.

In this instance, the flour still retains its initial composition, and is still considered chametz at the time when one must obliterate his chametz.

Since hides were not placed in the trough together with the flour, the flour will not spoil in a brief time. Nevertheless, the residue of substances in the tanner’s trough will cause the flour to spoil over the course of these three days (Rashi, Pesachim, loc. cit.).

Pesachim, loc. cit. The rationale is that the flour will not have spoiled in this short interval (Rashi).

The Alter Rebbe seems to be referring to the mixtures of chametz and other substances mentioned in the previous subsections. The basis for his ruling would then be Magen Avraham 442:7, which makes a similar statement with regard to the inedible chametz in the tiriaca. However, Divrei Shalom states that this leniency also includes kitniyos. Although the Ashkenazic community follows the custom of forbidding eating such substances during Pesach, it is permitted to benefit from them, as will be explained in sec. 453:3-5. See Terumas HaDeshen, responsum 113.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 12), the Alter Rebbe focuses on a question that might be raised regarding his ruling in this subsection, that whenever one is permitted to own a substance over Pesach, he is also permitted to benefit from that substance during Pesach. This ruling seems to disagree with that of Rabbeinu Tam, as cited by Tosafos in Pesachim 21b.

Tosafos quote Rabbeinu Tam as permitting a Jew to possess kutach over Pesach, and yet forbidding him from selling it to a non-Jew. Maharsha (to Pesachim, op. cit.) rules in the same manner, and Chacham Tzvi (responsum 86) accepts these rulings.

The Alter Rebbe reconciles his ruling in the main text with the rulings of these authorities by explaining that there are two differences between his ruling and theirs. These authorities are speaking about kutach that contains less than an olive-sized portion of chametz in a p’ras of kutach, and they are ruling according to Scriptural Law. Hence, Tosafos (Pesachim 42a) maintain that according to Scriptural Law, it is forbidden to eat and to benefit from such kutach. This follows the approach of Rabbi Eliezer in Pesachim 43a, who maintains that although one does not violate a Scriptural prohibition by possessing such chametz during Pesach, deriving benefit from it is forbidden by Scriptural Law, just as it is forbidden to partake of it. However, in his ruling in this subsection, the Alter Rebbe is stating a general rule regarding Rabbinic Law, namely that whenever the Sages did not issue a decree forbidding the possession of chametz over Pesach, they also did not issue a decree forbidding benefiting from that chametz over Pesach. Hence, the opinion of these authorities does not represent a contradiction to the Alter Rebbe’s ruling in the main text, for in the instance mentioned by Tosafos, by contrast, the prohibition against benefiting from the mixture of chametz is of Scriptural origin.

The Alter Rebbe notes that there are Sages who differ with Rabbi Eliezer and maintain that it is forbidden to benefit from the mixture described only according to Rabbinic decree. Nevertheless, their ruling does not represent a contradiction to the Alter Rebbe’s ruling here, for this prohibitive decree is of a different nature. The Alter Rebbe explains that the decree regarding kutach was instituted as a safeguard lest one err and benefit from a mixture that contains an olive-sized portion of chametz in a p’ras of the mixture, thus transgressing a Scriptural prohibition.

Moreover, in actual practice, there is no contradiction between the rulings of these authorities and the Alter Rebbe’s ruling here. Rabbeinu Tam (as cited by Rabbeinu Asher, Pesachim 3:1) forbids maintaining possession of kutach during Pesach, as a decree lest one partake of it. This view is accepted by many later authorities (see sec. 431:4).

If, however, a mixture contains chametz, it is forbidden to partake of it, as stated in subsection 22.

Rabbeinu Asher (Pesachim 3:5) relates that the leading rabbis of Alsace-Lorraine would wear starched clothes during Pesach.

The Alter Rebbe discusses this ruling in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 13), and states that the source for the obligation to obliterate starch used for clothes is Magen Avraham 442:5. In that source, Magen Avraham states that some authorities instructed women to be careful to starch their scarves at least 30 days before Pesach (see the following subsection). Magen Avraham explains that apparently these authorities maintain that the starch used to launder the scarves is visible. Hence, for the women to be permitted to use the starch, it would have to be applied at least 30 days before Pesach, because once the starch is 30 days old, the chametz it contains is no longer fit to be eaten.

TheAlter Rebbe explains that those people who are not careful to refrain from starching the clothes they will be wearing on Pesach less than 30 days before the holiday maintain that the starch used when laundering clothes is not considered visible. Magen Avraham provides support for this practice by drawing a parallel between the flour used to starch clothes and flour used as paste to glue papers on windows.

The Magen Avraham’s distinction between chametz that is visible and chametz that is not visible is based a responsum of Rabbi Eliezer of Bonn (Raviah, responsum 487), regarding flour used for paste to glue papers on windows.However, Turei Zahav 442:2 does not accept the distinction made by Raviah between chametz that is visible on the borders of papers that have been glued to a window with chametz paste and chametz that is not visible there. Instead, Turei Zahav maintains that the reason for permitting women to starch their scarves within 30 days of Pesach is that once chametz is used to make starch, it is considered to be impaired, i.e., not fit to be eaten. Thus, this chametz never has to be obliterated. Hence, Turei Zahav maintains that one who desires to be stringent should not base the stringency on the presumption that the chametz is visible. However, Turei Zahav concludes that there is no obligation to act stringently.

Chok Yaakov 342:10, however, refutes the arguments of Turei Zahav and justifies Raviah’s distinction between chametz that is visible and chametz that is not visible. The Alter Rebbe cites many other authorities who rule in accordance with Raviah’s ruling. The Alter Rebbe’s ruling in this subsection is derived by combining the equation of clothes and paper made by Magen Avraham and accepting the ruling of Raviah and others, as Chok Yaakov advises.

If, however, there is less than that amount of chametz, the clothes and/or the papers may be left as is.

For example the window had cracks and/or holes and the owner covered them up by sticking paper on them, or the paper was glued onto the window to block sunlight or to allow for privacy.

Hence, as long as there is not an olive-sized portion of chametz-paste on one piece of paper, there is no need to obliterate the chametz. In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 14), the Alter Rebbe compares this ruling to his rulings in subsections 27-29 below, which speak about chametz stuck to a kneading trough and to the walls of a house.

The Alter Rebbe explains that Magen Avraham 442:5 compares an olive-size bit of dough stuck to a window to an olive-sized portion of dough stuck to a kneading trough, which is intended to strengthen the kneading trough. The Alter Rebbe then points out that Magen Avraham used terse wording regarding people who leave an olive-sized portion of dough stuck to their kneading trough. However, the Alter Rebbe states that the following distinction should be made between the two instances. The kneading trough is a utensil. Hence, all the dough stuck to it is considered a single entity. By contrast, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to state, the window is considered part of the house, which in turn is halachically considered to be connected to the ground, and thus is considered to be part of the ground itself. This is reflected by a ruling in Hilchos Shabbos (see sec. 313:17). Hence, all the pieces of dough stuck to the walls of a house are not combined and considered a single entity, as reflected in the ruling in subsection 29 (see also Kuntreis Acharon, note 16, summarized in footnote 180), which is based on the Talmud Yerushalmi (Pesachim 3:2). Hence, only when there is an olive-sized portion of dough in one place on a piece of paper stuck to a window, is the dough significant. Otherwise, all the pieces of dough stuck to the window are not combined and are not considered of any importance.

See sec. 313:17, where the Alter Rebbe stated this principle. See also sec. 40:5, where the Alter Rebbe made a similar statement.

In the Talmudic – and later – eras, dough was used as a paste to plug up holes and cracks in walls. As will be stated in subsection 29, as long as there is not an olive-sized portion of chametz in one place in the wall of a building, there is no need to obliterate these pieces of dough. See also subsection 27.

Divrei Shalom explains the difference between this rationale and the rationale mentioned earlier: that the very composition of the chametz has been impaired.

The Alter Rebbe’s source for this ruling is Magen Avraham 442:4. However, in that source Magen Avraham speaks of placing kosher-for-Pesach flour in these clothes during Pesach, while in this ruling the Alter Rebbe forbids placing such flour in this clothing before Pesach. The Alter Rebbe substantiates this ruling in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 15). In that source, the Alter Rebbe cites Chok Yaakov 442:11, which restates Magen Avraham’s ruling using wording similar to that used by the Alter Rebbe in the main text, i.e., mentioning flour designated for use during Pesach, implying that the stringent ruling forbidding one to place kosher-for-Pesach flour in starched clothes applies even before Pesach.

In the Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe first questions that conclusion (and his own ruling in the main text), by stating that seemingly, the flour used as starch would be nullifiedin the mixture of kosher-for-Pesachflour if the two types of flour became mixed together before Pesach. This rationale is reflected in Rav Yosef Caro’s ruling in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 95:5). Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe resolves this question based on Chok Yaakov 466:13, which explains that the flour in the starch is stuck together into small, hardened pieces, which differ from ordinary flour. Ordinary flour mixes well and hence, a mixture of two types of ordinary flour is considered like a mixture of two liquids. Thus, when ordinary flour which is chametz becomes mixed with ordinary flour which is kosher-for-Pesach, there is room for leniency. In contrast to this, flour that has hardened into pieces will not mix well with ordinary flour, and will remain a distinct entity within the ordinary flour.

Hence, a mixture comprised of these pieces of hardened flour and ordinary flour is considered as a mixture of solids in liquid, in which instance, even though the solids cannot be strained and removed from the liquid, they are a distinct entity within the liquid. Therefore, the solids are not considered as batel in the liquid. This is the view of Turei Zahav (Yoreh Deah 104:1) and others. Therefore, there is no room for the leniency of considering the pieces of starch as batel in the flour.

Since this wheat starch is old, it is considered chametz nukshah. Although generally, chametz nukshah can benullifiedwhen combined in a mixture with other substances during Pesach, the Alter Rebbe explains in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 15) that, in this instance, this leniency does not apply. The rationale is that, as explained in the previous footnote, since the flour in the starch has formed hard, little clumps, it will not mix well with ordinary foods. Hence, this flour will not become batel when mixed with other substances.

This point is relevant with regard to the well-known stringency of not using matzah shruyah (gebruks, i.e., matzah that came in contact with liquids) during Pesach. The Alter Rebbe (responsum 6; see also responsum 18) writes that the concern is that some of the flour used for the matzah dough was not mixed well and therefore did not bake together with the matzah. These bits of flour will have leavened and then become stuck to the matzah. Although these bits of flour are considered as chametz nukshah, they will not become batel when mixed with other foods because they will harden and turn into little clumps, similar to the pieces of hardened flour from the wheat starch discussed in the previous footnote.

In previous generations, dough was often used as a makeshift putty to fill cracks and plug holes in utensils. See subsection 25 above, and footnote 166 there.

Pesachim 45a.

As explained in Pesachim 45b, when the dough is covered with mortar, it is evident that the owner’s intent is not to consider it as a separate entity, but rather to consider it as part of the kneading trough.

The amount of dough is significant because of its size. Even if the dough is several months old (see sec. 447:54) and considered chametz nukshah, when there is an olive-sized bit of dough in one place, it is considered an entity of consequence that retains its independent identity, and does not become batel to the kneading trough as a whole.

See Rashi, Pesachim 45a. Since these pieces of dough are small and intended to support the kneading trough, they are not considered as significant entities with independent importance. Instead, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to explain, they are deemed as part of the kneading trough.

The implication here is that the owner must nullify his possession of these small pieces of dough. There is a difference of opinion among the authorities as to whether the owner is obligated to obliterate these small pieces if he did not nullify his possession of them. See the discussion of this matter in the following subsection and the footnotes there.

Later in his life, the Alter Rebbe changed his opinion regarding this matter. His final ruling is that it is not necessary for the owner to nullify his possession of these pieces of dough or to obliterate them {see the Kuntreis Acharon (note 18, explained in footnote 186 below)}.

Pesachim 45b.

Pesachim 45a. In this instance, the pieces of dough that are stuck to the kneading trough were not placed there intentionally. Rather, the bits of dough are there only because the owner was lax and had not cleaned them off. See subsection 31 below. See also sec. 444:8, and sec. 451:1.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 16), the Alter Rebbe discusses the general rule stated in this and the following subsection: when a building or a utensil contains less than an olive-sized portion of chametz that is not attached to it, the owner is obligated to obliterate the dough. However, if this small amount of dough is attached to either a building or a utensil, it need not be obliterated.

There is an exception to this principle: When several small pieces of chametz are attached to a utensil and are not intended to strengthen the utensil, if these pieces would comprise the size of an olive were they to be combined together, then these pieces must be obliterated. In that instance, it is considered as if the utensil joins all the pieces of dough together and hence, the owner is obligated to obliterate them. The Alter Rebbe’s ruling is based on Talmud Yerushalmi (Pesachim 3:2), which states:

When there are two portions [of chametz], each [smaller than] the size of an olive, in a house, the house does not cause them to be [considered as] joined together. When they are in a utensil, the utensil causes them to be [considered as] joined together.

[A question is raised:] Behold, it was taught: “Less than this amount [i.e., an olive-sized portion] is considered insignificant because of its small size.”

[In resolution:] That applies when [the chametz] is not attached [to the utensil. The above ruling] applies when [the chametz] is attached [to the utensil].

Although the Alter Rebbe does not accept all the particulars of the Talmud Yerushalmi, the fundamental concepts – that if the pieces of chametz are attached to the utensil, the utensil virtually joins together the different pieces, and that chametz that is not attached to a utensil must be obliterated even if there is less than an olive-sized portion – are reflected in his rulings.

To explain the Kuntreis Acharon point by point: The Alter Rebbe begins by referring to Magen Avraham 442:10. In that source, Magen Avraham cites a difference of opinion among the halachic authorities regarding whether it is necessary to obliterate pieces of chametz that are smaller than the size of an olive. Rabbeinu Yitzchak Alfasi (in his halachic gloss to Pesachim, ch. 3) and Rambam (Hilchos Chametz U’Matzah 2:15) rule that a portion of dough that is smaller than the size of an olive and that does not reinforce the broken pieces of a kneading trough or plug a hole in the kneading trough must be obliterated. Other Rishonim, including Tosafos, Rabbeinu Asher, and Ramban, maintain that it is not necessary to obliterate pieces of chametz that are smaller than the size of an olive.

On this basis, the rulings of Rav Yosef Caro in his Shulchan Aruch are difficult to understand: In sec. 442:7, he quotes Rambam’s wording exactly. Nevertheless, in Orach Chayim 442:11, he rules that small pieces of dough must be obliterated only because the kneading trough in which they are found causes them to be combined to reach the size of an olive. To reconcile these rulings, it must be said that in Orach Chayim 442:11, Rav Yosef Caro is only referring to dough attached to a kneading trough. If the dough is not attached to a utensil, it must be obliterated even if it is not the size of an olive.

(The reason such small bits of dough must be obliterated is that there is concern that one might err and eat them, as the Alter Rebbe proceeds to state in the main text. When, by contrast, the dough is attached to the kneading trough, it stays there for a longer time, and it becomes unfit to be eaten, like the soiled dough mentioned in the main text.)

To summarize, Rav Yosef Caro rules that when there are small pieces of dough attached to a kneading trough, which if they were to be combined would comprise less than the size of an olive, they need not be obliterated. This ruling applies even if the bits of dough are not intended to strengthen the kneading trough. This leniency may be followed since the issue regards Rabbinic Law and – as mentioned above – there are many authorities who do not require pieces of chametz that are smaller than the size of an olive to be obliterated even when they are not attached to a kneading trough or other utensil.

The Alter Rebbe concludes that all the above applies according to the letter of the law. Nevertheless, as stated in subsection 30 below, “the Jewish people are holy [and are accustomed to conducting themselves stringently].” Hence, the Jewish people follow the custom of scraping away all scraps of dough. (There are several other points mentioned in this Kuntreis Acharon thatconcern chametz attached to a building.These points are relevant to the Alter Rebbe’s ruling in the following subsection, and will be explained in the footnotes to that subsection.)

The Alter Rebbe’s wording implies that if some of the attached pieces of dough are intended to strengthen the kneading trough, while others that are not intended for that purpose are also attached to it, only the pieces that are not intended to strengthen the kneading trough are counted to see if they can be combined to reach the size of an olive. Those that are intended to strengthen the kneading trough are considered part of the utensil, and are not included in this reckoning.

As mentioned in footnote 178 above, the Alter Rebbe retracted this ruling in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 18, explained in footnote 186 below). In that Kuntreis Acharon, the Alter Rebbe ruled that it is not necessary for one to nullify his possession of these pieces of dough.

I.e., the dough is not firmly pressed into the cracks.

Devarim 16:3-4. The word “it” refers to the Paschal sacrifice.

See Beitzah 2a,7b; see also Pesachim 5a. Although the Alter Rebbe appears to be quoting a prior source, the exact wording he uses is original. See Marei Mekomos VeTziyunim.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 17), the Alter Rebbe notes that although there is a Scriptural prohibition against partaking of less than an olive-sized measure of chametz, as there is with regard to other forbidden foods, there is no such prohibition against maintaining possession of less than an olive-sized portion of chametz during Pesach. The Alter Rebbe cites Chacham Tzvi (responsum 86) who explains this concept at length.

Although one is obligated to obliterate even less than an olive-sized portion of chametz, that obligation is Rabbinic in origin. This is evident from sec. 444:19, which states that a person who left his home and remembered that there is less than an olive-sized portion of chametz in his home is not required to return home and obliterate this small bit of chametz. This ruling applies even if the person traveled from his home for purely personal reasons (i.e., not in order to fulfill a mitzvah), and even if he remembers about the chametz after the sixth hour on the day before Pesach when he is no longer permitted to nullify his possession of chametz. Were the violation of a Scriptural commandment to be involved, the person would certainly be required to obliterate the chametz, particularly since he left home for personal reasons. Leniency was granted only because the obligation to destroy this small amount of chametz is Rabbinic in origin. See also footnote 190 below.

Nevertheless, as stated in sec. 446:3, a blessing is not recited when obliterating less than an olive-sized portion of chametz.

In his Kuntreis Acharon (note 18), the Alter Rebbe reviews his decision on this matter, and reverses several of his rulings in subsections 27-29, in sec. 446:1, and in the Kuntreis Acharon there (note 1). The Alter Rebbe states that he further explained the reversal of his position in the Kuntreis Acharon to sec. 447. Unfortunately, however, that Kuntreis Acharon is not extant.

The Alter Rebbe writes that in his original ruling, he followed Magen Avraham 442:12. In that source, Magen Avraham rules that even though it is not necessary to obliterate less than an olive-sized portion of chametz, it is necessary to nullify one’s possession of such a small amount of chametz. Nevertheless, the Alter Rebbe ultimately retracted that position.

To explain: Rambam (Hilchos Chametz U’Matzah 2:16) rules that less than an olive-sized portion of dough that is attached to the walls or the floor of a building need not be obliterated. Rabbeinu Asher (Pesachim 3:2) explains that Rambam would agree that even if the dough is not attached to the building, it need not be obliterated. Maggid Mishneh, Kessef Mishneh, and others, by contrast, rule that Rambam’s ruling should be understood literally – only dough that is attached to the walls or the floor of a building need not be obliterated. Magen Avraham (op. cit.) writes that although these authorities do not require that attached chametz be obliterated, they do require that the owner nullify his possession of such chametz. The Alter Rebbe writes that he retracted his acceptance of Magen Avraham’s position and changed his ruling in his Shulchan Aruch. (Unfortunately, however, that revised edition of the text is not extant.)

The rationale for the Alter Rebbe’s ruling is that just as bits of baked chametz that are smaller than the size of an olive need not be obliterated or nullified because they are inherently of no importance, so too, pieces of dough smaller than the size of an olive need not be obliterated or nullified because they are inherently of no importance.

This reasoning is reflected in the Alter Rebbe’s rulings in subsection 3 and in sec. 446:4.

This reasoning is reflected in the Alter Rebbe’s explanation of the motivating rationale for the search for chametz in sec. 331:4 and sec. 333:19.

Vayikra 7:23, as interpreted by Yoma 74a.

The Alter Rebbe uses the words, chatzi shiur, whose literal translation is, “half a measure.”

Although there is a Scriptural prohibition against partaking of less than an olive-sized portion of chametz, there is no Scriptural prohibition against possessing that amount, as stated in footnote 185, above. See also the Kuntreis Acharon (note 1) to sec. 302; sec. 340:1, 4; and sec. 346:1. These sources discuss whether a person violates a Scriptural commandment when he performs a forbidden act, but his act does not require punishment because he did not perform the full measure of activity or consume the full measure of food that the Torah prescribes for punishment to be meted out. See also the Alter Rebbe’s Choshen Mishpat (Hilchos Gezeilah U’Geneivah, subsection 1),which states: “Scriptural Law forbids the violation of a commandment even when [the violation involves] less than the minimum measure [for which punishment is meted out].” These concepts are also discussed in Likkutei Sichos (Vol. 7, p. 110, note 36). See also sec. 347:1, and the footnotes there, in Vol. 6 of this edition of the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch.

One is only obligated to obliterate these pieces of dough as a precaution, lest he partake of them. Therefore, if there is less than an olive-sized portion of dough in the kneading trough, and the dough is not fit to be eaten, the owner is not obligated to obliterate this bit of dough.

Talmud Yerushalmi, Pesachim 3:2.

Were these bits of dough to be halachically considered as joined together, the owner would be obligated to obliterate the chametz according to Scriptural Law. If the owner did not obliterate this chametz, he would violate the Scriptural prohibitions against having chametz seen in his domain and possessing chametz.

The Alter Rebbe’s wording is based on Magen Avraham 442:12. However, this ruling is slightly problematic, for according to Scriptural Law, it is even sufficient to nullify one’s possession of an olive-sized portion of chametz, and if there is less than an olive-sized portion of chametz, one does not violate the Scriptural prohibitions against possessing chametz. Indeed, in his Kuntreis Acharon (note 18, discussed in footnote 186), the Alter Rebbe writes that it is not necessary to nullify one’s possession of such small pieces of chametz according to Scriptural Law. See Tehilah LeDavid (Vol. 3, sec. 41), which raises these issues. See also footnote 199 below.

The Alter Rebbe’s intent is two pieces, each less than size of an olive, but whose sum will be the size of an olive.

Pesachim 45b.

Thus producing an olive-sized portion of chametz.

An exedra is a porch-like structure outside the house. See sec. 433:2.

Pesachim, op. cit., questions whether one is obligated to obliterate the chametz in such a situation, and leaves the issue unresolved. Since this matter only involves a Rabbinical prohibition, the lenient perspective is accepted.

See sec. 460:5, which differentiates between crumbs of chametz and pieces of dough. In that source, the Alter Rebbe explains that one need not nullify his possession of pieces of chametz that are smaller than the size of an olive, since they are insignificant. Nevertheless, pieces of dough that are this small must be nullified, since it is possible they will be joined with other small pieces of dough and reach the size of an olive. Even though it is unlikely that this will occur, and therefore, these small bits of dough need not be obliterated, the fact that this possibility exists endows them with a certain measure of importance. Hence, the owner must nullify his possession of pieces of dough that are smaller than the size of an olive.

See sec. 433:30, sec. 434:12, et al., where this principle is stated.

The Alter Rebbe repeats this directive in sec. 451:48. The Alter Rebbe also mentions selling a non-Jew kneading troughs and all other utensils which may contain chametz in his Hilchos Mechiras Chametz. See page 623.

This is a requirement mandated by Rabbinic Law. In contrast to this, as the Alter Rebbe specified in the main text, the measure stated in the previous subsection only stems from a stringency the Jewish people accepted upon themselves.

See subsection 28, above.

See sec. 451:50, where the Alter Rebbe differentiates between wooden kneading utensils and metal ones.

As mentioned in the preface to Hilchos Mechiras Chametz (see p. 616), when Rav Yosef Caro wrote his Shulchan Aruch, the scope of articles included in the sale of chametz to non-Jews before Pesach was far more limited than in the Alter Rebbe’s time. The Alter Rebbe’s wording in his Shulchan Aruch reflects the practices in the earlier era. As the development of halachah progressed, the scope of the articles included in that sale was expanded. In Hilchos Mechiras Chametz, the Alter Rebbe issued directives reflecting this progression, and suggested including utensils like those mentioned in the main text in the sale.

See sec. 451:51, where the Alter Rebbe issues similar directives.

As explained in sec. 448:6, this is acceptable because the non-Jew is not obligated to return the utensils that were given to him as a gift.

Pesachim 21b. As stated in subsection 21 above, one is only forbidden to maintain possession of chametz that is fit to eat. See also sec. 445:11.

See subsection 22, above, which mentions similar laws.

The implication is that the person is not liable for eating this chametz according to Scriptural Law. See a parallel ruling in sec. 612:8-11.

The Alter Rebbe specifically mentions writing with such ink on Chol HaMoed, because writing is forbidden on the festive days of Pesach. See sec. 495:1-2. See also sec. 340:4ff.

The beer was used as a base for the ink.

Tehilah LeDavid (Vol. 3, sec. 42), questions the Alter Rebbe’s ruling, noting that the ruling is based on Terumas HaDeshen (responsum 129). Terumas HaDe- shen, however, speaks about using ink cooked with beer before Pesach, that was owned by a Jew before the time it was necessary to obliterate chametz. Since the beer is no longer fit to be eaten, the Jew would normally be permitted to maintain possession of it, and benefit from it, over Pesach, as reflected by the ruling in subsection 24, “Whenever one is permitted to maintain possession of a substance [during Pesach], it is permitted to benefit from it during Pesach.” However, since the Sages were worried that the scribe might put his quill in his mouth and suck a bit of the ink which contains beer, they instituted a decree forbidding one to use such ink during Chol HaMoed Pesach.

In the main text, the Alter Rebbe speaks of an instance where a non-Jew cooked the ink with beer during Pesach. Seemingly, were the ink to belong to the Jew, even though the ink was cooked by a non-Jew, it would then be forbidden for a Jew to benefit from the ink because it contains chametz, just as it is forbidden to benefit from chametz that belonged to a non-Jew after the time it is necessary to obliterate chametz (see sec. 443:3). Furthermore, since we follow the principle, “Whenever one is permitted to maintain possession of a substance [during Pesach], it is permitted to benefit from it during Pesach,” then the opposite also applies, that if it is forbidden to maintain possession of a substance over Pesach it is forbidden to benefit from the substance during Pesach.

Divrei Shalom resolves this difficulty by positing that the Alter Rebbe is referring to an instance where the non-Jew remained the owner of the ink he prepared on Pesach, and permitted – or instructed – the Jewish scribe to write with it. Such a situation is possible when a Jew works as a scribe for a non-Jewish employer.

See subsection 32 above, which states that one may maintain possession of chametz that is unfit for a dog to eat, but may not partake of such chametz.