Without Fear or Worry

An Act and Its Consequences

[It is written:]1

And Moshe grew up and he went out to his brethren.... He saw an Egyptian man beating an Israelite... and he smote the Egyptian…. And he went out on the next day... and he said to the wicked man: “Why are you striking…?”

And [that person] replied: “Do you intend to kill me...?”

Moshe became frightened and said: “The matter has indeed become known....” And Pharaoh heard... and he sought to kill Moshe. And Moshe fled....2

On the phrase,3 “And Moshe became frightened,” Rashi comments:

[The verse should be understood] according to its simple meaning. [Alternatively,] according to the Midrash,4 he was worried because he saw wicked informers among the Jewish people. He thought, “So perhaps they will not deserve to be redeemed.”

The question arises: Why does the simple meaning (that Moshe feared for his life because it had become public knowledge that he killed the Egyptian) not suffice?5 Why must Rashi also cite the interpretation of the Midrash6 — his fear that his brethren would not deserve to be redeemed — which is not at all alluded to in the verse?7

It is possible to offer a simple resolution to the above questions. Rashi was seeking to address a general difficulty raised by the verse: “And Moshe became frightened and said, ‘The matter has indeed become known.’ ” Why does the Torah mention this point?8 After all, Moshe’s fear did not lead to any action, for he did not flee to Midian until after Pharaoh heard about the matter and sought to kill him.9

To resolve this question, Rashi cites the interpretation of the Midrash which explains that Moshe’s fear was not motivated by concern for his own future, but rather came as a result of his worry that the Jewish people were not worthy of redemption.10

When the Great become Frightened

The Torah’s words should never be interpreted in a manner that departs from their simple meaning.11 We must therefore assume that even according to the simple meaning of the phrase, “And Moshe became frightened” — that he feared for his life because it had become known that he killed the Egyptian — there is an explanation (at least according to the approach of derush)as to why the Torah mentions his fear.

To understand the above, let us first cite the comments of the Midrash12 on the verse,13 “And Yaakov became very frightened and he was distressed:”

R. Pinchas said in the name of R. Reuven: Two people received promises from the Holy One, blessed be He — the most outstanding of the Patriarchs and the most outstanding of the Prophets — and, nonetheless, they became frightened.

“The most outstanding of the Patriarchs” — this is Yaakov.... The Holy One, blessed be He, told him,14 “Behold, I will be with you,” and yet ultimately, “Yaakov became very frightened.”

“The most outstanding of the Prophets” — this is Moshe.... The Holy One, blessed be He, told him,15 “Behold, I will be with you,” and yet ultimately, Moshe became frightened. [This is intimated by the verse,]16 “And G‑d told Moshe: ‘Do not fear him (Og).’ ” And “do not fear him” is said only to a person who becomes afraid.

The commentaries on the Midrash differ with regard to the intent of this passage. Some maintain17 that the Midrash is praising Yaakov and Moshe. Although they received promises from G‑d, they did not rely on the promise,18 fearing that perhaps they had sinned19 and were thus unworthy of having the promise fulfilled.20

However, other commentaries21 explain that the intent of the Midrash is that “one should not learn from their example, for one ought not be afraid.” Rather,22 “[one’s] heart should be settled, trusting in G‑d.”23 This intent is apparent from the plain meaning of the continuation of the Midrash: “The Prophet Yeshayahu admonishes the Jewish people, telling them,24 ‘You have forgotten G‑d Who made you... and you are continually frightened throughout the day’ ” ; i.e., the prophet rebukes them for being afraid.25

The view of the commentaries that “one ought not be afraid” is worthy of exploration. What is wrong with fearing [that one is unworthy of the fulfillment of G‑d’s promises because of] “the effect of one’s sins”?

(On the contrary, at first glance this would appear to be a very positive quality: one’s humility is so great26 that he is always concerned that his Divine service is not flawless and that he has sinned.27 )

This question focuses on the nature of the attribute of bitachon, trust in G‑d, which we are commanded to pursue.28 Bitachon is not merely the faith that G‑d has the potential to bestow good upon a person and save him from adversity and the like. Rather, it means that the person trusts that G‑d will actually do this. And his trust is so absolute that he is serene and does not worry at all. As Chovos HaLevavos states,29 “The essence of bitachon is the serenity of the person who trusts. His heart relies on the One in Whom he has placed his trust — that He will do what is best and most appropriate for him in the matter at hand.”

Now, the grounds for such certainty are problematic. Even when a person has an explicit Divine promise, it is possible that “sin would cause” the promise not to be fulfilled. This certainly applies when there is no explicit promise. Moreover, the concern “lest sin cause” the promise not to be fulfilled is applicable to everyone (for “there is no man on earth [so] righteous that he does [only] good and does not sin.”)30 If even Yaakov our Patriarch had this fear, it certainly applies to others.31

A Rationale for Equanimity

At first glance, one might offer the following explanation: The concept of bitachon is based on the faith that everything comes from G‑d, blessed be He. Thus, when a person encounters distress and misfortune, this is not because an independent factor has control (Heaven forbid!) in any manner whatsoever. Rather, everything comes from Above.

A person with that awareness is therefore utterly serene. Either way, he has no reason to worry. For if he does not deserve that any evil be visited upon him, certainly G‑d will save him from it. (This is true even when there is no natural possibility for him to be saved — for “who can say to Him, What are you doing?”32 Moreover, He is able to change the laws of nature.)33

If, on the other hand, he is not worthy of G‑d’s kindness (but instead deserves punishment), his mind is still utterly at ease because he knows that his misfortune does not result from any side factor, but from G‑d alone. Since he did not fulfill his responsibilities to his Creator, He brought him to this distressing situation. Therefore he fears no one but G‑d alone. (Moreover, he realizes that this difficulty is for his own good, for even the punishments ordained by the Torah are expressions of G‑d’s kindness, cleansing a person from the blemish of sin. Thus there is no place for worry or fear.)

Accordingly, there is no contradiction. A person may have absolute bitachon in G‑d, even though he knows that possibly “his sin will cause” him to be found unworthy of being rescued from the impending misfortune. And this knowledge does not detract from his peace of mind, for he realizes that whatever happens to him comes from G‑d.

According to this explanation, we can appreciate the intent of the commentaries to the Midrash who maintain that “one ought not be afraid,” and that we should not learn from the conduct of Yaakov and Moshe. As is evident from the simple meaning of the relevant passages, they were afraid of the immediate cause of their distress. Yaakov was afraid of Eisav, as it is written, “And Yaakov was very frightened and distressed, and he [therefore] divided the people....” Similarly, Moses had to be warned not to fear Og. The fact that they had such fear indicated that something was lacking in their consummate trust in G‑d.

Not the Province of a Select Few

This explanation is, however, insufficient — for it is obvious that the essence of bitachon is not merely the peace of mind [that comes from the awareness that everything is ordained by the hand of G‑d], but that the person who has bitachon trusts that he will receive visible and manifest good,34 i.e., that G‑d will rescue him from his difficulties.

According to the above explanation, it appears that this simple meaning of bitachon is beyond the reach of the majority of the Jewish people. (For “there is no man on earth [so] righteous that he does [only] good and does not sin”30 — and who can adjudge himself as being worthy of G‑d’s kindness?) Hence, for most people, bitachon would be reflected primarily in the peace of mind that they have due to their awareness that, even if they are not to be found worthy of Divine beneficence, everything comes from G‑d. Moreover, they realize that everything is for their good, except that that good is not visible and manifest.

([According to this approach,] only perfectly righteous men, whose Divine service has reached consummate perfection and who therefore do not have to worry about the possible effects of sin,35 can trust that they will receive manifest and apparent good.36 )

Such an approach, however, runs contrary to the approach of the author of Chovos HaLevavos,37 whostates (in his explanation of “the circumstances in which bitachon is conceivable”) that “the One Who is trusted is infinitely magnanimous and kind toward whoever is deserving and to whoever is not. Moreover, His magnanimity is constant and His kindness is continuous, never ceasing and never severed.” According to this view, the concept of bitachon is based on the principle that G‑d bestows kindness even toward “whoever is not [deserving].”

Now, this requires explanation. After all, even though G‑d’s mercy extends also to someone who is not deserving, is it not possible that a person may be deserving of punishment for his undesirable deeds?38 What is the conceptual foundation for a person’s trust that G‑d will act benevolently toward him, even though he is undeserving of this?

Cast Your Burden upon G‑d

The above questions can be resolved in light of an adage of the Tzemach Tzedek, quoted frequently by my revered father-in-law, the Rebbe [Rayatz].39 Someone had begged him to intercede in order to arouse Heaven’s mercies40 upon a patient who was dangerously ill. The Tzemach Tzedek answered: Tracht gut, vet zain gut (“Think positively, and the outcome will be positive”). It is apparent from the response of the Tzemach Tzedek that thinking positively (having bitachon in G‑d) will in itself give rise to results that are visibly and manifestly good.

This teaching may be explained as follows: The obligation of bitachon which we are commanded to cultivate is not merely a component and a corollary of one’s faith (emunah) that everything is in the hands of G‑d and that He is compassionate and merciful. Such an obligation would not need to be stated separately. Rather, the obligation of bitachon is an avodah of its own, a separate thrust in Divine service. That challenge is that a person should rely and depend on G‑d alone, to the extent that he casts his lot entirely upon Him, as it is written,41 “Cast your burden upon G‑d”; i.e., the person depends on no other support in the world apart from G‑d.

It could well be that this is what the author of Chovos HaLevavos had in mind when he wrote42 that a person’s bitachon should resemble that “of a bondman imprisoned in a dungeon on the authority of his master.” That prisoner’s trust is beamed only toward his master, “to whose hands he is subordinate, and no man but him can bring harm or help.”

(It follows that our trust in G‑d is such that our actual material situation is of no consequence. Even if according to the natural order it is impossible for a person to be saved, he relies on G‑d, Who is not restricted by nature at all.)

An Interactive Relationship

This itself is the foundation for a person’s trust that G‑d will bestow visible and manifest good upon him, even if he is not worthy of this kindness.

For the definition of trust is not to believe that because the kindness of G‑d is utterly measureless and unlimited and can be extended to a person whether he is worthy or not, he will therefore receive G‑d’s kindness without any effort on his own part. (Were this to be true, the entire concept of reward and punishment would thus be nullified.) Rather, bitachon involves labor and exertion within one’s soul — and it is this effort and exertion that evokes G‑d’s kindness.

When a person truly trusts in G‑d alone from the depths of his soul, to the extent that he has no worry at all, this very arousal [of trust] evokes a reciprocal response from Above, granting him kindness — even when, without taking this trust into account, he would not be worthy of such kindness.

This concept is borne out by the writings of our Sages. For example, commenting on the verse,43 “A person who trusts in G‑d will be encompassed by kindness,” Sefer HaIkkarim44 states explicitly: “Even if a person is intrinsically undeserving, bitachon has a way of evoking unearned lovingkindness on those who place their trust in G‑d.” Moreover,45 “If a person had placed his hope [in G‑d] as he ought to, G‑d’s lovingkindness would not have been withheld [from him].”

These ideas are echoed in Kad HaKemach:46 “He who trusts in G‑d will be raised out of misfortune by virtue of his trust, even if he was deserving of that misfortune.”47

This, then, is what is meant by the command48 to trust in G‑d — that a person should “cast his burden on G‑d,” relying on Him to grant him visible and manifest good. Since he trusts G‑d alone (without making calculations as to whether or not it is possible for him to be saved according to the natural order), this causes a corresponding approach49 toward him in the spiritual realms. G‑d protects him and has pity on him, even if the tally shows that he does not deserve to be granted the kind of good that is visible and manifest as good.50

This is the meaning of the adage of the Tzemach Tzedek cited above: the person’s bitachon itself will lead to positive results. This principle is not a tangential element of our trust in G‑d: it defines the nature of the trust that we are commanded to have.

When Trust is Lacking

Based on the above, it is possible to say that this is the intent of our verse that speaks about Moshe’s fear when he heard his fellow Jew say, “Do you intend to kill me like you killed the Egyptian?” The verse intended to teach this fundamental message with regard to the quality of bitachon: that it is bitachon itself that brings about G‑d’s salvation. The opposite is also true. When a person is not saved from distress, the reason is that his bitachon is lacking.51

This is the intent of the verse, “And Moshe became frightened and said: ‘The matter has surely become
known.’ ” (And directly after that we are told:) “Pharaoh heard... and he sought to kill Moshe. And Moshe fled....” The fact that Moshe feared for his life and did not trust G‑d52 that no harm would befall him as a result of his positive efforts (to protect a Jewish man from the Egyptian who was striking him and to rebuke the two Jews who were arguing) was itself the cause for Pharaoh to hear of the matter and to seek to kill him. Moshe’s lack of trust caused him to have to flee for his life.

(One might explain that this is the intent of the wording of the verse, “And [he] said: ‘The matter has surely become known.’ ” Not only did Moshe think these thoughts within his heart, he expressed them in speech.53 This increases the emphasis on his lack of bitachon. For in addition to having this apprehension in his mind, he spoke about it.)54

If he had had complete bitachon in G‑d and not have worried at all about his circumstances (that “the matter had become known” and would be discovered by Pharaoh), that would have caused the matter to have been forgotten and would have brought him visible and manifest good.

A Catalyst For Redemption: Individual and Collective

The above thoughts lead to a practical directive. When a person encounters obstacles and hindrances in his observance of the Torah and its mitzvos, he should realize that the elimination of those obstacles depends on him and on his conduct. If he has absolute trust that G‑d will help him and change the situation to the point that he is utterly at ease without any worry at all, his bitachon will bear fruit. (At the same time, of course, he must also take whatever natural steps are dependent on himself in order to remove those obstacles.)55 For we have been been given the promise, “Think positively, and the outcome will be positive.” We have been promised that this will take place actually, that all of the obstacles and encumbrances will cease to exist and that things will be good for that individual — in a real and practical sense, with the kind of good that is overt and manifest even to fleshly eyes, in the tangible here and now.56

Just as concerning to the redemption from Egypt the Sages teach that57 “by virtue of their trust the people of Israel were redeemed from Egypt,” so, too, with regard to the Redemption from this last exile, the Midrash states:58 “They are deserving of redemption in reward for their hope [alone]!” So may this indeed be fulfilled with us — that by virtue of the Jewish people’s trust in the promise that “My deliverance is soon to come,”59 we will merit that G‑d will redeem us in the true and ultimate Redemption. May this take place speedily, and in our own days.

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Footnotes

Adapted from farbrengens held on Shabbos Parshas Shmos, 5726 (1966) and Shabbos Parshas Beshalach, 5723 (1963) and published in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 36, p. 1.

Shmos 2:11-15.

Verse 14.

Midrash Tanchuma, Shmos, sec. 10; Shmos Rabbah 1:30. (In the latter source, this concept appears in the course of the teaching on the words, “The matter has indeed become known,” i.e., known to himself: Moshe now became aware of “the reason why the Jews were subjugated more than the other nations.” See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 31, p. 9, footnote 15, and pp. 13-14. See also Yefas Toar HaShalem on this passage.

Moreover, in the first and second printing of Rashi’s commentary, and in most of the manuscripts in my possession, Rashi’s commentary does not begin with the words, “[The verse should be understood] according to its simple meaning.” It begins with the words, “Because he saw….”

In particular, this question warrants explanation because, according to this interpretation of Moshe’s fear, it is also necessary to interpret the continuation of the verse (“The matter has indeed become known”) in a non-literal manner. Instead of its simple meaning (that the killing of the Egyptian was the reason for Moshe’s concern) another explanation is necessary. Therefore, when commenting on the latter phrase (after stating that this phrase should be interpreted straightforwardly), Rashi cites the Midrashic interpretation that “the matter is known to me, regarding the question that I would ponder, namely: How did Israel sin so severely to warrant their subjugation and back-breaking labor?” (See Midrash Tanchuma (Buber ed.), Va’eira, sec. 17; Shmos Rabbah, loc. cit.)

The commentaries to Rashi seek to understand Moshe’s question from an additional angle. After all, the enslavement of the Jewish people had been foretold in G‑d’s covenant with Avraham bein habesarim (Bereishis 15:13).

The difficulty is compounded by the fact that this interpretation itself requires explanation: How is it possible that the promise given by the Holy One, blessed be He, in the covenant bein habesarim would not be fulfilled?Early in the Introduction to his Commentary to the Mishnah, Rambam explains the difference between a Divine promise “with a positive message conveyed by a prophet to a nation,” which cannot be nullified, and “a Divine promise given privately to a prophet.” (See also below, under the heading, “When the Great become Frightened.”) See also the next footnote.

Moreover, how did Moshe know they were slanderers before they informed on him? (This question is raised by Imrei Shefer with regard to Rashi’s commentary.)

One might want to raise a similar question: Why was there any need for the entire narrative of Moshe, Dasan, and Aviram? After all, the Torah could have related merely that “Pharaoh heard” (about the killing of the Egyptian) and “Moshe fled.” That entire story about two Hebrew men arguing and their rebuke of Moshe (“Who appointed you?... Do you intend to kill me?...”) appears unnecessary.

However, this is not problematic, in light of a comment of Rashi on the phrase, “And Pharaoh heard.” There Rashi comments: “They [i.e., Dasan and Aviram] informed on him.” Thus, by recounting his earlier encounter with them, the Torah lets us know how this report reached Pharaoh.

Nevertheless, the earlier question remains, for we are not given an explanation as to why the Torah tells us that Moshe became frightened.

By the way: Since Rashi does not state that this is a Midrash, we can assume that this is the simple meaning of the narrative. It is possible to explain that we are forced to come to this conclusion from the fact that the Torah tells us of Moshe’s interaction with them.

It is apparent that only these two men saw [Moshe] kill the Egyptian, for Moshe “turned this way and that way and saw that there was no one there” (Shmos 2:8). (The commentary of Rashi on that verse calls for clarification, but this is not the place for it.) It is therefore reasonable to assume that they were the ones who informed on him.

There is also another reason for the mention of Dasan and Aviram, for later on in the narrative, Moshe returns to Egypt “after all the men (i.e., Dasan and Aviram) who sought your life have died” (Shmos 4:19, and see Rashi’s commentary). See also Rashi’s commentary to Shmos 2:13: “Dasan and Aviram. They were the ones who [at a later time] left over the manna [in violation of G‑d’s command].”

The gloss of Maskil LeDavid to Rashi’s commentary questions: If Moshe feared for his life, why did he not flee until afterwards, when Pharaoh sought to kill him? See also the commentary of R. Ovadiah Sforno. Clarification is still required.

10.

[There is an obvious reason for Moshe’s fear. Nevertheless, since he did not act upon it, we must assume that it was not merely for his life. Hence, Rashi cites the interpretation of the Midrash to explain the subject of his concern.]

11.

This principle should certainly apply in the present instance, where Rashi not only gives an alternative, straightforward explanation of Moshe’s fear (kipshuto), but presents it before the Midrashic interpretation (uMidrasho).

12.

Bereishis Rabbah 76:1.

Bereishis 32:8.

Op. cit., 28:15.

Shmos 3:12.

Bamidbar 21:34.

See the commentary of R. Avraham ben Asher, quoted in Or HaSeichel to Bereishis Rabbah, loc. cit. (Venice, 5328/1568), that is cited by the commentary entitled Matnos Kehunah to Bereishis Rabbah, loc. cit.; Nezer HaKodesh HaShalem, loc. cit. Similar concepts are found in the Akeidah (Vayishlach), end of Shaar 26, et al.

18.

This follows the opinion in the Midrash (loc. cit., sec. 2, and commentaries there) that “there is no [secure] promise for the righteous in this world.” This approach is explained in light of the teachings of Chassidus in Biurei Zohar by the Tzemach Tzedek, p. 192. (It is also stated on p. 191 there, that the Divine service of these individuals surpasses the level of bitachon, trust in G‑d.)

19.

As our Sages explicitly state (in Berachos 4a, paraphrased by Rashi in his commentary to Bereishis 32:11), Yaakov feared that his sins would nullify the promised protection.

20.

This explanation is given by the commentaries to the Midrash, loc. cit. Similarly, the Akeidah states that [their fear] “did not stem from a lack of trust or of faith...; rather, their consummate level of Divine service demanded [that they seek to be saved by natural means, rather than by miracles].” See the sources mentioned in footnote 55 below.

21.

Yefas Toar HaShalem to Bereishis Rabbah, loc. cit., [citing Berachos 60a. See the commentaries to Ein Yaakov on that passage; see also Nesivos Olam (by the Maharal), Nesiv HaBitachon. This is not the place for further elaboration].

See also (et al.) the interpretation of Or HaSeichel, loc. cit. (s.v. Shnei bnei adam): “It is possible that being afraid is considered an error on the part of Yaakov and Moshe.”

22.

Tehillim 112:7, quoted in Berachos, loc. cit.

23.

This approach disputes the above-mentioned view that “there is no [secure] promise for the righteous in this world” (Yefas Toar, loc. cit.).

24.

Yeshayahu 51:13.

25.

See how the commentaries listed in footnote 17 interpret the continuation of the Midrash from their perspective.

26.

See Tanya — Iggeres HaKodesh, Epistle 2: “Since Yaakov was utterly insignificant in his own eyes,... [he was apprehensive] lest sin would cause [him not to be saved], for it appeared to him that he had sinned.”

27.

Cf. the question raised by the commentaries to Ein Yaakov (Berachos, loc. cit.) with regard to Hillel’s statement, “I am positive that this [cry of distress] is not coming from my house.” [The commentaries question why Hillel showed so much confidence. Why did he not worry that perhaps he had sinned, and as a result his household would be beset by difficulty?]

28.

The obligation to place one’s trust in G‑d is explicit in many verses. (Many of those verses are cited in Reishis Chochmah, Shaar HaAhavah, ch. 12.) In Shaarei Teshuvah (Shaar 3, Os 32),Rabbeinu Yonah explains that this obligation is included in the command stated in Devarim 20:1, “When you go out to war..., do not fear them.” (So, too, in the view of Rambam — in Sefer HaMitzvos, prohibitive commandment 58 — this verse is a command and not a promise.) Implied is that “if a person sees that adversity is close, he should set his heart on the salvation of G‑d and trust in it.”

29.

Shaar HaBitachon, beginning of ch. 1. See also his introduction to Shaar HaBitachon (s.v. Ach toeles habitachon), et al. See also Kad HaKemach (by Rabbeinu Bachaye), s.v. Bitachon: “No doubt should dampen one’s bitachon.”

30.

Koheles 7:20.

31.

See Kad HaKemach, loc. cit.: “A person who has faith may not necessarily have bitachon. For at times, he will fear that perhaps [his] sins will have an effect.” (And in his discussion of this issue, he cites the example of Yaakov our Patriarch.)

32.

Iyov 9:12.

33.

See the comments of Rabbeinu Yonah cited in Kad HaKemach, loc. cit. See also Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 3, p. 883, and the sources cited there in the marginal notes.

34.

In the original, batov hanireh vehanigleh — i.e., something that is recognizable as good without any need for theological explanations.

35.

See Kad HaKemach, loc. cit., and the commentaries to Ein Yaakov on Berachos, loc. cit.

36.

According to the opinion in the Midrash that “there is no [secure] promise for the righteous in this world,” on the contrary, the righteous do not rely [even] on a Divine promise.

37.

Shaar HaBitachon, ch. 2 (The Seventh Cause); see also ch. 3 (the introduction to The Sixth Concept); see also the end of ch. 1.

38.

As stated in Chovos HaLevavos (loc. cit., ch. 3, the fourth introduction): “Although one must take great care […] to fulfill whatever the Creator obligated us in His service[...] so that He will consent to give him the matters concerning which he places his trust,” this is only so that one’s present conduct should not contradict his bitachon in G‑d. For it is unthinkable to have bitachon in G‑d and simultaneously “to rebel against Him.” (The above source cites an example from mortal conduct: [an agent who neglects the mission with which he was entrusted cannot expect to be paid generously].)

Nevertheless, [the point is not that the person’s positive conduct evokes G‑d’s kindness]. Rather, the foundation and reason for his trust is that G‑d’s kindness encompasses all created beings. Thus, ch. 2 of the above source states that the first reason for our trust is “His mercy, compassion, and love.” And similarly, in ch. 3: “The Creator shows mercy on man more than any merciful being.”

39.

See his Igros Kodesh, letter #636, Vol. 2, p. 537, and letter #1990, Vol. 7, p. 197.

40.

As is appropriate according to the ruling of the Rama (Yoreh Deah, end of sec. 335).

41.

Tehillim 55:23.

42.

Loc. cit., ch. 2 (The Sixth Cause); see also the first introduction in ch. 3 with regard to The Fifth Concept.

43.

Tehillim 32:10.

44.

Maamar 4, end of sec. 46.

45.

Sec. 47.

46.

Loc. cit

47.

See also: Nesivos Olam, end of Nesiv HaBitachon, et al.; Yalkut Shimoni on Yeshayahu, Remez 473: “[When, in times of distress, Israel cries out to] the Holy One, blessed be He, [He] asks: ‘Is there a man among you who fears Heaven?... Place your trust in My Name, and it will stand you in good stead..., for whoever places his trust in My Name, I will save.’ ”

Note also Keser Shem Tov, sec. 382: “When [Heaven] desires to punish a person who deserves punishment, they deprive him of his attribute of trust.”

48.

Tehillim 37:3 and 115:9, and similarly in many other verses. See also the sources listed in footnote 28.

49.

[In the original, middah keneged middah — “measure for measure.”] The Zohar (II, 184b) teaches: “The World Above imparts influence [to the world below] only according to its state. If it manifests a luminous countenance, in the same way does a luminous Countenance shine down upon it from Above. And if it manifests melancholy,....” [Characteristically, the Rebbe omits the continuation of this teaching: “…strict justice is mirrored back at it.”] See also Igros Kodesh of the Tzemach Tzedek, p. 324ff.

50.

See Tanya — Iggeres HaKodesh, at the end of Epistle 11: “This faith causes everything to become truly good in a manifest way.” (See also Biurei Zohar by the Tzemach Tzedek, p. 194.) Similar concepts are to be found in Nesivos Olam, loc. cit.

51.

Berachos (loc. cit.) [relates that Yehudah bar Nasan, who was following Rav Hamnuna,] sighed. Rav Hamnuna told him, “Do you want to bring suffering upon yourself?! For it is written (Iyov 3:24): ‘[Because] I feared a fright, it has overtaken me.’ ” (This incident is cited in Yefas Toar HaShalem.) In other words, if Yehudah bar Nasan would rely on G‑d without any worry or fear, he would be saved from suffering. See also Nesivos Olam, loc. cit.

52.

Midrash Lekach Tov explains that Moshe’s fear [stemmed from his acceptance of] the perspective (Bereishis Rabbah, loc. cit.) that “there is no [secure] promise for the righteous in this world.” (See footnote 18 above.) According to the gloss entitled Be’er BaSadeh to Rashi’s commentary to our verse, the reason Moshe was afraid of being killed was that he feared that the Jewish people were not worthy of being redeemed. If, instead, he had been certain that they would be redeemed, he would not have been at all afraid of being killed, for he knew that his future mission was to redeem them.

53.

For here the Torah does not say (as it says, for example, in Bereishis 17:17), “And he said in his heart.”

54.

[The very fact that a thought is expressed in speech empowers it to materialize,] as is well known with regard to lashon hara, slanderous gossip. By speaking, one causes the subject’s undesirable qualities to emerge from a potential state into actuality. (See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 5, p. 45; Vol. 15, p. 32; et al.)

55.

As is well known, there is no contradiction between true bitachon in G‑d and looking for ways and means in the natural order [to solve one’s difficulties]. (This concept is elaborated upon in Chovos HaLevavos, loc. cit., ch. 3, the fifth introduction; in the Akeidah, Vayishlach, Shaar 26; and in other sources. See also Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 15, p. 486ff., and the sources mentioned there.) It is only perfectly righteous men who do not have to search for ways and means in the natural order. However, this is not the forum for an extended discussion of that issue.

56.

[In the original, lematah meiasarah tefachim — lit., “lower than ten handbreadths” (from the ground): a halachic concept borrowed here metaphorically.]

57.

. Kad HaKemach, loc. cit., based on Midrash Tehillim, Psalm 22.

58.

Yalkut Shimoni, Tehillim, Remez 736(basedon Midrash Tehillim, Psalm 40), cited by R. David Avudraham at the end of his Seder Tefillos Yom HaKippurim. See also the Chida, Midbar Kdeimos, Maareches Kuf, sec. 16.

59.

Yeshayahu 56:1.

Based on the teachings of the Lubavitcher Rebbe

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